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ABSTRACT: 
 
The research on coopetition (i.e., simultaneous cooperation and competition) has increased sig-
nificantly over the last two decades. Noteworthy findings have been made, including the bene-
fits that a firm gains from such a relationship. However, only limited studies centralize the im-
pact on performance through coopetition. Existing studies on coopetition and the effect on per-
formance show mixed outcomes, and researchers claim that the results depend on the firm's 
industry. Thus, it is relevant to analyze the impact of coopetition on market performance. The 
following study will examine the aforementioned research gap by looking into the airline indus-
try where coopetition relationship has been practiced in the form of strategic alliances for more 
than 20 years. The empirical analysis was based on a multiple case study of three airlines, from 
three different countries, operating in three different alliances. That allowed to investigate sim-
ilarities and differences among the diverse sized companies in terms of the performance impact. 
Primary data were collected through semi-structured interviews. Additionally, annual reports 
were used as secondary data and to enhance credibility through triangulation. Findings show 
that in general, coopetition through strategic alliances contributes positively to airlines. Never-
theless, the degree of how much airlines benefit from alliances depends on the position in the 
network and the airline's size. Airlines of small size gain most from the relationship, and airlines 
with a central position in the alliance give more to the strategic alliances than they get out. The 
findings reveal that airlines of large size gain less from alliances and increasingly form other types 
of partnerships like joint ventures that create a more balanced give and gain relationship. Not-
withstanding, the COVID epidemic will have a crucial impact on airlines and increase the im-
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This chapter has the purpose of introducing the topic of the study. First, the background 
of the master’s thesis will be presented. Second, the research question and its objectives 
will be introduced. This section also identifies the research gap. Finally, the delimitations, 
the main concepts, and the study's overall outline, will be displayed. 
 
 
1.1. Background of the study 
In today’s business world, changes occur faster, competition has become more intense, 
and customers are more demanding and have endless opportunities. Thus, firms contin-
uously need to analyze the market and adapt to be profitable and attract customers. To 
survive and stay competitive, firms not only compete with competitors anymore but 
have started to form cooperating relationships with them. This phenomenon of simulta-
neous cooperation and competition with competitors is termed coopetition. Coopera-
tion with competitors has especially received much attention as a subject of investiga-
tion during the last two decades as the form of business relationship has become a vital 
factor for firms. Researchers discovered various benefits from cooperating with compet-
itors, including access to knowledge and resources, cost-sharing, and uncertainty reduc-
tion. Even though it also leads to multiple challenges, coopetition allows firms to coop-
erate to create a bigger business pie while competing to divide it (Brandenburger & 
Nalebuff, 1996). 
 
Researchers have used existing theories to describe the concept of coopetition. Bran-
denburger and Nalebuff (1996) explained the framework through the game theory. 
Bengtsson and Kock (2000) use the resource-based view to elaborate on rivals’ simulta-
neous cooperation and competition. Another theory used to explain coopetition is the 
network theory (Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001). And in recent years, the resource de-
pendence theory has been applied to illustrate the concept of coopetition (Chiambaretto 
& Fernandez, 2016).  
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Nevertheless, research on coopetition still requires examination (Dagnino, 2009; Padula 
& Dagnino, 2007). The broadness and relative newness of the term leads to various 
knowledge gaps. Also, coopetition appears in multiple forms and industries, and aca-
demics describe it in narrow or broader terms. Therefore, a consensus on the general 
definition of coopetition has not been reached yet (Leite, Pahlberg, & Åberg, 2018). 
Moreover, researchers’ primary focus area has been the relationship between a seller 
and buyer, while the relationship between competing firms lacks research. The studies 
carried out have focused mainly on defining the coopetition concept and explaining its 
nature (Bengtsson & Kock, 2000). 
 
A topic related to coopetition that has been investigated to some extent is the perfor-
mance outcome. Researchers argue that it should lead to firms’ superior performance 
(Bengtsson & Kock, 2000; Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996; Gnyawali & Madhavan, 
2001). Nevertheless, studies on performance and the impact through coopetition have 
shown mixed outcomes. Ritala (2012, p. 308) suggests that the success of coopetition 
depends on the industry and economy a firm is embedded in, as well as firm-specific 
factors. The retained results of studies analyzing the effect on market performance are 
contradictory due to diverse outcomes and still lack further research. 
 
An industry where coopetition has been practiced for several decades is the aviation 
industry. The airline industry is dynamic, continuously changing, and highly uncertain. A 
form of horizontal coopetition in the airline industry is strategic alliances representing a 
network of several airlines. This form of partnership has emerged end of the 1990s’, after 
the airline industry’s deregulation. Moreover, it has become more important for full-ser-
vice carriers to cooperate with competitors since the low-cost business model grew in 




The findings of existing studies on whether or not strategic alliances contribute to an 
airline’s performance are mixed (Kuzminykh & Zufan, 2012). While Min and Joo (2016) 
claim that alliances do not lead to performance changes, other benefits emerging from 
the coopetition are found, including cost-saving and economies of scale. However, the 
studies focusing on market performance through coopetition in the airline industry are 
limited. Thus, it is relevant to analyze how coopetition in the form of strategic alliances 
impacts the market performance of airlines. 
 
The aspects mentioned above of coopetition, coopetition theory, the airline industry, 
and strategic alliances are used as a foundation for this thesis. Given the airline industry’s 
dynamic and uncertain environment, this master’s thesis targets to investigate the im-
pact of coopetition in the form of strategic alliances on airlines’ market performance. 




1.2. Research question and objectives 
The research of my master’s thesis will focus on analyzing the impact of coopetition in 
the form of strategic alliances on airlines’ market performance. By using theoretical 
frameworks, case studies, as well as empirical research, I aim to answer the research 
question: 
 
How does coopetition in the form of strategic alliances impact the market perfor-
mance of airlines? 
 
Objectives help to give the writer an overview of the different aims that will be achieved 
in the thesis to answer the research question at the end. Moreover, they serve a funda-
mental purpose for the reader. The following objectives have been set and divided into 
theoretical and empirical goals to answer the research question. 
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The objectives of the thesis can be divided into theoretical objectives: 
- Review of existing literature related to coopetition including its benefits and chal-
lenges, coopetition theories, as well as performance implications 
- Examine existing literature on the airline industry including its history, emergence 
of different business models, as well as key aspects of strategic alliances 
- Development of a theoretical framework that combines existing literature on 
coopetition and airline industry, and gives direction in identifying the impact on 
market performance 
 
And empirical objectives: 
- Analysis of three airlines each operating in a different strategic alliance 
- Analysis of similarities and differences between the airlines and their strategic 
alliance belonging 
- Analyzing the impact of coopetition through strategic airline alliances on market 
performance 
 
To achieve the objectives of this thesis, I collect literature about coopetition and the air-
line industry. Both areas of literature combined to enable the study of the impact of 
coopetition in the form of strategic alliances on the airlines’ performance. I adopt a de-
ductive research approach that leads the empirical analysis part, as well as the case study 
analysis. The choice of the thee airlines, Lufthansa, Finnair, and Alitalia, as case compa-
nies are grounded on various reasons. First, it connects the two countries the master 
program is received from, Italy and Finland, as well as my home country, Germany. Sec-
ond, these airlines operate each in one of the three strategic alliances, Star Alliance, 
oneworld, and SkyTeam. Another reason is the different operating sizes that allow me to 
analyze the impact of coopetition on airlines from different angles regarding size and 
position in the alliance. 
 
The COVID-19 pandemic has a significant impact on the airlines starting from the year 
2020. The data analyzed from the three case studies in the empirical part exclude the 
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year 2020. However, the result and impact of the pandemic are briefly discussed in the 
interviews. The COVID-19 epidemic began to spread and received more attention 
throughout Europe, starting in February 2020. While in China, it already began earlier in 
the year 2020. Moreover, in the United States, the pandemic was treated as a threat a 
bit later than in Europe. Each country has its regulations and restrictions. But in general, 
the virus caused the population to stay inside, which lead to a shutdown of the economy. 
The airline industry especially suffered from the pandemic because airlines had to keep 
most of their fleet on the ground for several months. 
 
The study differs from earlier research in various ways. This thesis’s novelty is the use of 
three airlines as case companies, which allows a more detailed analysis. Moreover, the 
interviews combined with the data analysis of each airline from the past seven years 
allow an in-depth focus. Additionally, the topic coopetition is relatively new and, there-
fore, contains knowledge gaps. It has been found that coopetition would substantially 
impact firm performance (Le Roy & Sanou, 2014). Previous work claims that coopetition 
positively affects performance (Morris, Koçak, & Özer, 2007; Cho & Lee, 2019). However, 
some disagreements and studies suggest that coopetition would weaken companies’ 
performance (Ritala, Hallikas, & Sissonen, 2008; Crick, 2019). The research results have 
shown some confusion about whether the coopetition strategy can be successful for a 
firm’s performance. Moreover, Gudergan et al. (2012) highlight that studies investigating 
the performance aspect of coopetition in specific industries lack, especially the impact 
on performance in an alliance formation. 
 
An industry where coopetition has been practiced for more than 25 years is the airline 
industry (Le Roy & Czakon, 2016). However, the industry mentioned above has not been 
studied intensively in connection with coopetition. While various reports analyze the in-
dustry’s motives and tensions, little has been studied about airlines’ market perfor-
mance from coopetition. According to Ritala (2018, p. 322), market performance gener-
ally offers the potential for future research. Furthermore, the airline industry is divided 
into three main strategic alliances, which act as a coopetitive network, but researchers 
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have paid little attention to the performance impact. Thus, this study aims to increase 





By defining the delimitations, it will provide the reader with the scope of the study. The 
topic of coopetition is broad and needs to be narrowed down. By describing the delimi-
tations, it defines the boundaries of the research. First, coopetition occurs in various 
industries and at different levels, which allows multifaceted research options. However, 
this research is limited to the performance management of firms interacting in coopeti-
tion. By doing so, the aim is to answer the research question of how coopetition in the 
form of strategic alliances impacts airlines' market performance. 
 
The focus of the study is to analyze coopetition in the alliances, specifically in the airline 
industry. Despite the concentration in the airline industry, the analysis of all airlines 
would exceed its length. Therefore, the attention is on three airlines that operate in one 
of the three largest strategic airline alliances. By concentrating on Lufthansa, Finnair, and 
Alitalia, the study will give a thorough insight into the impact that coopetition has on 
airlines' performance. Furthermore, the airlines are the national carrier of three differ-
ent countries, Germany, Finland, and Italy, and operate in the alliances: Star Alliance, 
oneworld, and SkyTeam. 
 
During the last two decades of intense research about the concept of coopetition, dif-
ferent theories have been applied to explain the phenomenon of simultaneous cooper-
ation and competition of rivals. The utilized theories are diverse and range from game 
theory, resource-based view, network theory, and transaction cost economics to para-
dox theory and resource-dependence theory, to mention just a few. Therefore, it is cru-
cial to narrow down the literature review on the essential theories for analyzing airlines 
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and alliance networks concerning performance management. Thus, the resource de-
pendence theory, resource-based view, and network theory are centralized in this study. 
 
In this study, a qualitative data collection method is utilized. Various academics that fo-
cus on coopetition have conducted quantitative techniques to extend the state of re-
search. However, this paper obtains its primary data by conducting semi-structured in-
terviews with experts from each airline. Before the interviews, data from each airline 
was gathered and analyzed to get a first impression of the past seven business years. The 
analysis of the three case companies holds vital information that contributes to answer-
ing the research question. This research design allows novelty and can be of significance 
in future research regarding the airline industry's coopetition. 
 
 
1.4. Main concepts and definitions 
The utilized key concepts in this thesis are briefly defined and presented below. The 
choice for each definition will be further explained in this thesis. These terms include 
competition, cooperation, coopetition, performance, and strategic alliance. 
 
COMPETITION – “Firm’s orientation to achieve above-normal profits and conquer a com-
petitive advantage over other firms” (Padula & Dagnino, 2007) 
 
COOPERATION – “Acting together, in a coordinated way at work, leisure or in social rela-
tionships, in the pursuit of shared goals, the enjoyment of the joint activity or simply 
furthering the relationship” (Argyle, 1991, p. 4) 
 
COOPETITION – The simultaneous competition and cooperation between two or more 
rivals competing in global markets (Luo, 2007, p. 130) 
 
PERFORMANCE – ”The level/degree of goal achievement of an organization/department” 
(Samsonowa, 2012, p. 25) 
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STRATEGIC ALLIANCE – “Two or more firms that unite to pursue a set of agreed-upon 
goals remain independent subsequent to the formation of the alliance” (Mockler, 
Dologite, & Carnevali, 1997, p. 250) 
 
 
1.5. Outline of the study 
The first chapter of this thesis has the purpose of introducing the background of the 
study and the main concepts and definitions. Moreover, the research question, delimi-
tations, and the theoretical, as well as empirical objectives, are presented. Additionally, 
this chapter provides an overall outline of the study. 
 
The second chapter gives an overview of the coopetition concept, including reviewing 
the existing literature about the terminology itself and its benefits and challenges. The 
resource-based view, resource dependence theory, and network theory are examined 
as a theoretical approach to coopetition research. Finally, the performance implications 
concerning coopetition are analyzed. 
 
The third chapter contains an overview of the airline industry. The first subsection begins 
by examining the history of the airline industry. Afterward, a general approach to the 
terminology “business models” is presented before focusing on airline business models. 
Furthermore, strategic alliances in the airline industry are analyzed. After discussing the 
different parts through an extensive literature review, a theoretical framework 
summarizes the results. 
 
The outline of the methodology is in the fourth chapter. It presents the methodological 
approach and clarifies the research design. Following, the chosen data collection 
technique is explained to analyze the impact of coopetition on airline performance. 
Finally, the study's trustworthiness is elaborated, consisting of credibility, transferability, 
dependability, and confirmability. 
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The fifth chapter presents the empirical findings of the study and the case study analysis. 
For the case study, three airlines – Finnair, Lufthansa, and Alitalia are presented and 
analyzed. First, a single case study analysis is conducted, followed by a cross-case 
analysis. 
 
The final chapter of the study includes a summary of the findings. Moreover, it is 
emphasized how the study contributes to existing theories of coopetition and the airline 
industry. Also, managerial implications are suggestions. Finally, limitations and 
recommendations for the future are discussed. The thesis structure is visualized in Fig-




2. An Overview of the Concept of Coopetition 
This chapter aims to introduce the concept of coopetition. Firstly, the term coopetition 
is defined along with its advantages and challenges that emerge from pursuing such a 
strategy. Secondly, theories that can be linked to the concept of coopetition are pre-
sented, highlighting the resource-based view, resource dependence theory, and network 
theory. The final part of this chapter analyzes performance implications concerning 




2.1. Coopetition as Strategy 
Coopetition is a portmanteau word and combines the term cooperation and competition. 
The term coopetition was first used in the 1990s by the chief executive officer (CEO) of 
Novell to describe its firm’s relationships (Fernandez, Chiambaretto, Le Roy, & Czakon, 
2018, p. 1). In the late 1990s, Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996) dedicated their semi-
nal book on “Coo-petition”. They were among the first to investigate the concept before 
it became a growing field of research in strategic management. Since then, academics 
have shown considerable interest in the topic and have studied in different directions 
and developed various theories (Le Roy & Czakon, 2016). Several papers indicate the 
multifaceted appearance of coopetition in various industries and diverse firm sizes and 
types. Moreover, cooperation with rivals takes place on different levels, including indi-
vidual, organizational, and inter-firm/ network levels. The broad field of investigation 
and emergence of coopetition, leads to the fact that there is no clear definition of the 
terminology yet (Bengtsson, Eriksson, & Wincent, 2010; Gnyawali & Park, 2009; Gnyawali 
& Madhavan, 2001). Table 1 shows a collection of definitions from various researchers 




In general, coopetition is a paradox, and most scholars describe the term as simultane-
ous cooperation and competition of activities with rivals (Bengtsson & Kock, 2000; Kim 
& Parkhe, 2009; Luo, 2007). Until two decades ago, a vast amount of research has been 
done by focusing on cooperation and competition separately, instead of studying the 
concept as a whole. A definition that describes the term competition precisely is by Pad-
ula and Dagnino (2007): “Firm’s orientation to achieve above-normal profits and conquer 
a competitive advantage over other firms”. It contains the key aspects of competition: 
achieving high profits and an advantage compared to rival firms. While cooperation can 
be defined as “acting together, in a coordinated way at work, leisure or in social relation-
ships, in the pursuit of shared goals, the enjoyment of the joint activity or simply further-
ing the relationship” (Argyle, 1991, p. 4). The definition includes the main aspects which 
are working together to achieve a common goal. Porter (1980) states in his book “com-
petitive strategies” that all firms that provide similar products to similar customers must 
be seen as competitors. The literature about competition often neglects the possibility 
that cooperation can be a part of the relationship and is viewed “as a market imperfec-
tion” that hinders a firm from achieving a competitive advantage (Bengtsson et al., 2010, 
p. 195). Similarly, pure cooperation is widely studied and views competition only as a 
negative factor without considering positive impacts that can arise from it (Fernandez et 
al., 2018). 
 




Business is cooperation when it comes to creating a pie and compe-
tition when it comes to dividing it up. In other words, business is war 
and peace 
Lado, Boyd, and Hanlon 
(1997) 
The notion of syncretic rent-seeking behavior to explain how firms 
can generate economic rents and achieve superior, long-run perfor-
mance through simultaneous competition and cooperation 
Bengtsson and Kock (2000) The dyadic and paradoxical relationship that emerges when two 
firms cooperate in some activities, such as in a strategic alliance, and 
at the same time compete with each other in other activities 
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Gnyawali and Madhavan 
(2001) 
Simultaneous cooperative and competitive behavior 
Luo (2007) The simultaneous competition and cooperation between 
two or more rivals competing in global markets 
Padula and Dagnino (2007) Firms interact on the basis of a partially convergent interest struc-
ture, and to explore the factors responsible for the intrusion of com-
petitive issues (i.e., the drivers of the rise of coopetition) within a 
cooperative game structure 
Bengtsson and Kock (2014) A paradoxical relationship between two or more actors simultane-
ously involved in cooperative and competitive interactions, regard-
less of whether their relationship is horizontal or vertical 
 
Preliminary research about coopetition was carried out by Brandenburger and Nalebuff 
(1996). They compare the concept with a business pie growing in size through coopera-
tion, while actors simultaneously compete to get a bigger pie. They have a broader view 
and describe coopetition as connections in a value-net where firms are embedded in 
multiple relationships (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1995). The value-net includes the firm, 
customers, suppliers, competitors, and complementors (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 
1995). That implies that the relationship between members can be dyadic, triadic, or 
within a network, highlighting the firm's interdependence with its industry players that 
cooperate and compete simultaneously (Dagnino, 2009). The coopetition in a value-net 
is described as a win-win strategy (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1995). 
 
Contrary, some researchers maintain a more narrow view of coopetition and focus on 
coopetition between a pair (Bengtsson & Kock, 2000; Gnyawali & Park 2011). Bengtsson 
and Kock (2000, p. 411) conclude that “the most complex, but also the most advanta-
geous relationship between competitors, is “coopetition” where two competitors both 
compete and cooperate with each other”. Chen (2008) argues that coopetition is a con-
tradiction and compares the term with yin and yang to emphasize the inverse relation-
ship between cooperation and competition. In 2014, Bengtsson and Kock (2014, p. 182) 
reframed their coopetition definition since the market dynamics changed and evolved 
to be more challenging. They conclude that “coopetition is a paradoxical relationship 
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between two or more actors simultaneously involved in cooperative and competitive 
interactions, regardless of whether their relationship is horizontal or vertical” 
(Bengtsson & Kock, 2014, p. 182). 
 
The growing interest in coopetition led to the creation of different research streams that 
analyze the concept on various levels (Bengtsson & Kock, 2014; Dorn, Schweiger, & 
Albers, 2016). Coopetition takes place at four different levels. First, coopetition can arise 
at the individual level, assuming that coopetition occurs between two individuals or 
groups of individuals. Secondly, coopetition can exist in internal companies and depart-
ments (Tidström, 2008). This level of coopetition describes the researcher Dagnino 
(2009) as a micro-level. It can also be described as the intra-organizational level and re-
fers to relationships between employees, managers, or business units. Lin, Yuan-Hui and 
Yu-Fang (2010) found out that coopetition between team members can increase individ-
ual performance through a cooperative knowledge sharing attitude while also keeping a 
competitive mindset. However, the difficulty in balancing between the paradox of coop-
eration and competition often leads to tension and demand managers to act upon it, to 
avoid a negative impact (Bengtsson, Raza-Ullah, & Vanyushyn, 2016). 
 
After Brandenburger and Nalebuff published their seminal book about “Co-opetition” 
(1996), managers and researchers started recognizing that a high number of business 
relations are based on the concept of cooperation with competitors. At the interfirm 
level, coopetition relationships can be horizontal, which refers to the cooperation be-
tween competing firms on the same activities, in the same market, and/ or the same 
products (Chiambaretto & Dumez, 2016). Contrary, interfirm relationships can be verti-
cal, which refers to a supplier-retailer relationship, and coopetition occurs at different 
levels of the value chain (Chiambaretto & Dumez, 2016). Fourth, coopetition can take 
place between groups of companies or between companies operating in different sec-
tors. This level is also known as macro-level (Dagnino, 2009). The coopetition phenom-
enon can appear in two forms: bilateral, a relationship between two firms, or multilateral, 
which refers to three or more firms such as a network or cluster (Cygler, Sroka, Solesvik, 
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& Debkowska, 2018). Padula and Dagnino (2007) point out that interfirm relations were 
only viewed separately either from the cooperation paradigm or the competition para-
digm in the past. However, coopetition is a synthesis of the cooperation paradigm and 
the competition paradigm (Padula & Dagnino, 2007). 
 
The mentioned definitions about coopetition highlight three central aspects. First, the 
simultaneous behavior of cooperation and competition, second, the number of actors 
involved, and third, where coopetition takes place that is often distinguished between 
vertical and horizontal interactions. Luo (2007) follows similar aspects as other research-
ers to define the concept of coopetition. However, his definition highlights the global 
market's occurrence and emphasizes that firms interact with major global rivals to 
achieve benefits through cooperation. Thus, the researcher describes coopetition as 
“the simultaneous competition and cooperation between two or more rivals competing 
in global markets” (Luo, 2007, p. 130). This definition is adopted as the central descrip-
tion of the term coopetition in this thesis. 
 
A recent paper by Bengtsson and Raza-Ullah (2016) has reviewed various contributions 
to coopetition from the past. The researchers analyzed and summarized the findings and 
developed a multi-level model that gives insight into the drivers, processes, and coopeti-
tion outcomes. Drivers that push or pull firms to form coopetitive relationships can be 
either external, such as industry characteristics, internal, which includes vulnerability, or 
relational drivers, such as partner characteristics (Bengtsson & Raza-Ullah, 2016). 
Coopetitive relationships deal with processes that can be dynamic, challenging, and 
complex. The dynamic processes refer to changing interdependencies between actors 
and the paradox of the concepts of cooperation and competition. The complex nature 
of processes is about multiple and conflicting relationships with other firms in a network 
(Bengtsson & Raza-Ullah, 2016, p. 30). Moreover, coopetitive processes are challenging 
and often fail to achieve the desired outcome. Finally, coopetition can have different 
effects on innovation, knowledge, and relationship-related ones, and impact firm perfor-
mance. A more simplified visualization of the DPO framework can be found in Figure 2. 
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Bengtsson and Kock (2000) highlight that each party has different core competencies 
that can be shared. Therefore, cooperating with competitors allows access to external 
knowledge and resources. Furthermore, the opportunity to take advantage of actors’ 
resources and knowledge makes the firm more efficient than other players in the indus-
try (Bengtsson & Kock, 2000). According to Morris et al. (2007), access to resources and 
capabilities from partners positively affects a firm’s position in the market. Also, Ritala 
and Hurmelinna-Laukkanen (2009) argue that knowledge sharing and creation are often 
advantageous. The unique combination of knowledge and resources that actors of 
coopetitive relationships have given them an advantage that no other firm could be ca-
pable of on their own (Bengtsson et al., 2010). 
 
Besides benefits in value creation and access to knowledge and resources, coopetition 
also creates economic benefits. Gnyawali and Park (2009) suggest that cooperating with 
competitors leads to economies of scale, reduction of uncertainty and risk, as well as 
increases speed in product development. Moreover, Luo (2007) underlines that many 
different costs can be shared and minimized, such as fewer expenses in R & D, marketing, 
technology, manufacturing, or other aspects. A study conducted by Peng et al. (2012) 
found that firms benefit from coopetition in various ways. Firms can speed up market 
entry, have access to new markets, as well as increase market power. However, their 
research also draws attention to performance outcomes, which increase for a certain 
period but not necessarily in the long-run. Peng et al. (2012, p. 548) conclude that the 
results from cooperating with competitors are “beyond to what would have been possi-
ble” alone. Kock et al. (2010) highlight the growing international opportunities that arise 
from coopetition, such as the increase in international recognition of the firm and the 
access to distribution networks. 
 
The study of Chin, Chan and Lam (2008) proposes various success factors for coopetition. 
Those factors are management leadership, long-term commitment, organizational learn-
ing, trust, knowledge and risk sharing, information system support, and conflict manage-
ment. They claim that coopetition “can reduce up-front costs, learning costs, and 
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increases effectiveness and efficiency” (Chin et al., 2008, p. 449). Moreover, a group of 
researchers analyzed horizontal airline alliances’ impact on firm performance and 
whether it affects productivity and profitability (Oum, Park, Kim, & Yu, 2004). The out-
come is that “horizontal alliances make a significant contribution to productivity gains, 
whereas they have no overall significant and positive impact on profitability” (Oum et 
al., 2004, p. 844). 
 
Another advantage that can be taken from cooperating with competitors is the impact 
on performance. Various researchers investigate coopetition in relation to diverse per-
formance implications (Le Roy & Czakon, 2016; Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001). Le Roy and 
Czakon (2016) summarize that coopetition positively affects a firm’s market share and 
productivity. Hence, it leads to an increase in financial performance (Le Roy & Czakon, 
2016). Another benefit derived from coopetition is the positive impact on innovation 
performance, which derives from the fact that firms aim to keep up with their competi-
tors (Park, Srivastava, & Gnyawali, 2014). Moreover, according to Bouncken and Fredrich 
(2012), cooperating with competitors has been found to improve a firm’s ability to inno-
vate. 
 
2.1.2 Challenges of Coopetition 
Even though the benefits mentioned above seem tempting to perform coopetitive be-
havior with competitors, there are tensions and challenges involved when devoting one-
self to those relationships. Any relationship relies on communication, trust, and sharing 
of tangibles and intangibles (Chin et al., 2008). However, a coopetitive relationship is not 
only about cooperating but also competing, and therefore, these elements need to be 
balanced carefully (Bengtsson & Kock, 2014). Tidström (2018) describes tensions as “sit-
uations of conflict or incompatibility between firms involved in coopetition”. Those ten-
sions and challenges appear on an individual, organizational, and inter-firm level 
(Bengtsson & Kock, 2014). 
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Gnyawali and Park (2009) point out that coopetition leads to negative aspects that in-
clude loss of control and management challenges. Also, Bouncken and Fredrich (2012) 
emphasize that the paradoxical relationship only benefits if it is built on trust and inter-
dependence. And the outcome of a temporary connection is often made on a low level 
of trust because the central aim is to achieve a goal after which the relationship is ended 
(Cygler et al., 2018). Further risks are mentioned by Ritala et al. (2008), who found out 
that coopetition in a strategic alliance with too many core competitors harms firm per-
formance. 
 
Tidström (2014, p. 261) summarizes four types of coopetitive tensions: role tension, 
knowledge tension, power and dependence, and opportunistic tension. Bengtsson and 
Kock (2000) investigated the tension that relates to roles and occurs on organizational 
and individual levels. Tidström (2014, p. 262) explains tension on the organizational level, 
as “an organization that cooperates with a competitor may perceive a tension between 
the goals of the organization and the goal of the cooperation”. In comparison, individual 
tension appears, for example, when people within an organization interact as well as 
with members of the simultaneously cooperating and competing company. The second 
type of tension relates to knowledge and is about the balance between sharing an keep-
ing information secret to avoid being outperformed by the competitor (Morris et al., 
2007). Another tension is power and dependence and aims to point out that some firms 
in paradoxical relationships have the intention to exploit their “power (which may be 
financial, technical, or emotional power for example)” (Tidström, 2014, p. 263). Addi-
tionally, Tidström (2014) points out that tension often occurs in coopetitive relationships 
between small and large firms due to unbalance, such as resources and pricing policies. 
 
Finally, opportunistic tension refers to the possibility that one firm exploits the other 
party because it feels threatened or has the chance to develop its business in the com-
petitors area (Tidström, 2014). Another risk that arises from the relationship where in-
dividuals, firms or networks not only cooperate but also compete is the leakage of infor-
mation by rivals (Hoffmann et al., 2018). Moreover, Gnyawali and Park (2009) highlight 
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that coopetition can lead to technological risks such as imitation. Hence, it is crucial to 
have the right balance between pooling strategic resources and protecting core compe-
tencies. Crick (2019) also claims in his paper “the dark side of coopetition”, that the right 
balance in a paradoxical relationship is crucial and otherwise could be harmful to the 
firm’s performance. He states that with too little coopetition “firms might struggle to 
survive within their markets, with an insufficient volume of resources and capabilities” 
and with too much coopetition “companies could experience increased tensions, poten-




Figure 3. Summary: Benefits and Challenges of Coopetition 
 
 
2.2. Theories of Coopetition 
Coopetition is a relatively new terminology, and researchers have tried to explain the 
concept by using existing theories. One of the firsts to study coopetition were Branden-
burger and Nalebuff (1996), who explained the framework through the game theory. 
Contrary, Bengtsson and Kock (2000) use the resource-based view to analyze and elabo-
rate on rivals' simultaneous cooperation and competition. Furthermore, another 
- Value creation
- Access to knowledge
- Access to resources
- Economies of scale
- Reduction of uncertainty and risk
- Speed in product development
- Speed in market entry
- Access to new markets
- Increase of market power





- Loss of control
- Management challenges
- High number of core competitors
- Dependence 
- Balance of knowledge
- Exploitation of power
- Unbalance between firms
- Opportunism
- Leakage of information
 26 
common theory used to explain coopetition is the network theory (Gnyawali & 
Madhavan, 2001). And in recent years, the resource dependence theory has been ap-
plied to explain the concept (Chiambaretto & Fernandez, 2016). Following, a brief inside 
about the game theory is provided. Afterward, a more detailed literature review about 
the resource-based view, resource dependence theory, and network theory is presented, 
which are relevant theories for this study. 
 
The game theory, was one of the first theories to describe the strategic success of 
coopetition. The theory is based on the assumption that all players have the opportunity 
to achieve a benefit through coopetition, which is based on the positive-sum game 
(Cygler et al., 2018). This benefit would not be possible to achieve without the coopera-
tion with competitors (Le Roy et al., 2018). Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996) describe 
coopetition as a structure where firms interact with multiple competitors as a dynamic 
network. This is also emphasized by the game theory, where the outcome of the inter-
action depends on other actors. The game theory illustrates “how value can be created, 
divided, and potentially damaged when firms interact” (Charleton, Gnyawali, & Galavan, 
2018, p. 24). 
 
2.2.1. Resource-based view 
The resource-based view (RBV) was developed by Barney (1991) who assumes that firms 
can create superior performance through resources. The managerial framework (Figure 
4) describes how firms can achieve a sustainable competitive advantage through valua-
ble, rare, inimitable, and substitutable strategic resources. In his article (Barney, 1991, p. 
102), he defines a sustainable competitive advantage as firms who are “implementing a 
value creating strategy not simultaneously being implemented by any current or poten-
tial competitors and when these other firms are unable to duplicate the benefits of this 
strategy”. The theory lies on two assumptions, first, firms or groups control heterogene-
ous resources, and second, “resources may not be perfectly mobile across firms, and 
thus heterogeneity can be long lasting” (Barney, 1991, p. 101). Thus, the differences in 
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Figure 4. Framework: Resource based view (Barney, 1991) 
 
The resource-based view has been used by various researchers to explain the phenom-
enon of simultaneous cooperation with competitors (Bengtsson & Kock, 2000; Gnyawali 
& Park, 2009; Ritala, Golnam, & Wegmann, 2014). The firsts who explains coopetition 
through the RBV were Bengtsson and Kock (2000). They realized that firms are building 
relationships with rivals to get access to unique resources and share R & D activities. 
Gyawali and Park (2009) also use the resource-based view to highlight the advantages 
and the importance of coopetition. They emphasize that the concept allows firms or 
networks to access resources that would otherwise be inaccessible on their own. This 
way, firms can develop a competitive advantage. Furthermore, Luo (2007) highlights that 
resource asymmetry leads to cooperation between global competitors. 
 
The resource-based view gives evidence about why competitors team up with each 
other and cooperate. Even if they have similar and complementary resources, it allows 
firms to take advantage of economies of scale and group learning (Gnyawali & Park, 
2011). Various researchers highlight the benefits that stem from the resource-based view. 
Among the most mentioned are that additional value is created, learning is encouraged, 
and firms have access to resources that would otherwise be inaccessible (Bengtsson et 
al., 2010). Thus, according to the framework of the resource-based view, through the 
















to achieve a competitive advantage and increase performance (Barney, 1991). Addition-
ally, the resources of competitors allow the firms to save costs and time (Gnyawali & 
Park, 2009). 
 
2.2.2. Resource dependence theory 
The resource dependence theory was developed by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) and ar-
gued that firms do not have all essential resources and, therefore, have to engage with 
other actors and organizations in their environment. The three main aspects of the re-
source dependence theory are 1) social context matters, 2) actors have strategies that 
aim to seek autonomy and reach their goal, and 3) power is an important variable and 
explains relationships with other actors (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). A central assumption 
of the theory is that firms need access to resources because they do not control all re-
sources required by themselves (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Therefore, the social context, 
which refers to the system or network the firm is embedded in, is important for the per-
formance and success. Since Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) findings, the theory has become 
one of the most important ones among organizational theories and strategic manage-
ment (Hillman et al., 2009). 
 
The authors Pfeffer and Salancik (1978, p. xiii) highlight in their seminal book that power 
is an important variable in the resource dependence theory and state “that some organ-
izations had more power than others because of the particularities of their interdepend-
ence and their location in social space”. The firm that has best access to resources and 
best adapts to its environment can be most successful. According to Pfeffer and Salancik 
(2003), the relationship between actors is described as exchange relationship since both 
firms depend on each other. They claim that the interactions may positively affect the 
firms since it provides them with vital resources However, the dependency on actors can 
contribute negatively, as it is linked to uncertainty. Therefore, as Amalou-Döpke and Süß 
(2014) state, “the aim of the actors in a resource-dependent relationship is to reduce 
their own uncertainty with regard to the provision of critical resources, as well as to re-
duce their dependence or increase their own power”. 
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It has been emphasized that asymmetric relationships can contribute to stronger firms 
taking advantage of weaker ones (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). However, the advantage that 
one firm has control over a weaker part can not only be positive and create more value, 
it can also lead to destroying value (Gulati & Sytch, 2007). While some firms aim for the 
same resources in interfirm relationships, other firms can create a bigger pie through 
cooperation, and each actor seeks a different piece (Quintana-García & Benavides-
Velasco, 2004). Moreover, Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) propose that firms who bring most 
resources to an alliance can also claim the highest benefits. 
 
Five different options that reduce firms' environmental dependence have been intro-
duced (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). One of these options is that firms can form mergers 
and vertical integration (Hillman et al., 2009). Reasons for the formation are to reduces 
competition, “to manage interdependence with either sources of input or purchasers of 
output by absorbing them; and third, to diversify operations and thereby lessen depend-
ence on the present organizations with which it exchanges” (Hillman et al., 2009, p. 
1405). Furthermore, the reason why firms form joint ventures and other inter-organiza-
tional relationships such as buyer-supplier relationships, R&D agreements, or strategic 
alliances can also be traced back to the resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978; Hillman et al., 2009). 
 
The resource dependence theory has been used to explain the concept of coopetition. 
Aforementioned, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978, p. 41) claim that inter-organizational rela-
tionships can reduce dependence on external resources. To elaborate the interdepend-
ence further, they state “Interdependence existing between two social actors need not 
be either competitive or symbiotic-frequently, relationships contain both forms of inter-
dependence simultaneously”. The simultaneous occurrence of symbiotic and competi-
tive is highlighted by Gast et al. (2015) as the first explanation for cooperating with com-
petitors. Also, Parkhe (1993) emphasizes that mutual interdependence is crucial in alli-
ance formations because a lack would lead to a termination of the relationship. A study 
 30 
conducted by Lechner et al. (2016) delivered insight into the impact of vertical coopeti-
tion on young and small firms. The outcome is that young and small firms gain from 
relationships to larger firms, positively affecting the sale growths. However, the re-
searchers also point out that dependence on vertical partners, such as suppliers, sub-
contractors, or buyers, can also lead to negative impacts, which is when dependence is 
too high (Lechner et al., 2016). 
 
Chiambaretto and Fernandez (2016) analyze the formation of alliances from a coopeti-
tive perspective. As a base, they use the resource dependence theory and a case study 
of Air France to investigate the alliance composition and evolution over time during mar-
ket uncertainty (Chiambaretto & Fernandez, 2016). The research outcome is that an in-
crease in market uncertainty is not related “to a greater degree on collective strategies” 
(Chiambaretto & Fernandez, 2016, p. 81). Moreover, in uncertain market circumstances, 
firms prefer coopetitive alliances rather than collaboratives. Additionally, horizontal alli-
ance formations are preferred compared to vertical ones (Chiambaretto & Fernandez, 
2016). 
 
2.2.3. Network theory 
The network theory describes markets as networks of sustainable and long-lasting rela-
tionships (Johanson & Mattsson, 1988). The theory proposes that firms achieve an ad-
vantage by forming relationships with competitors with different but complementary re-
sources and capabilities (Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001). This allows them to get access 
to necessary resources and shape a firm’s performance. According to Czakon (2018, p. 
47), a network ”refers to multiple actors' interaction involving various firms covering the 
whole value network”. The network is formed through numerous actors that represent 
nodes connected through ties that represent the relationship between them (Charleton 
et al., 2018). Through those ties, the flow of ”assets, information, and status” is possible 
(Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001, p. 431). 
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As the market consists of many nodes and cumulative activities, it is important that firms 
have a certain market position that characterizes relations to others (Johanson & 
Mattsson, 1988, p. 472). These positions can be divided into micro-positions, represent-
ing the inter-personal relationships to other individual actors; and the macro-positions 
that describe the relations of parts or the whole network or cluster (Johanson & 
Mattsson, 1988, p. 472). By building those networks, the decision is not based on the 
geographical location but rather with whom to make connections (Persson, Mattsson, & 
Öberg, 2015). However, the construct of nodes and relations makes the firm vulnerable 
to unexpected changes, for example, if one firm is closing its operations, the relationship 
is breaking down, and the knowledge and resource flow is interrupted (Johanson & 
Mattsson, 1988). 
 
The network theory can also be used to explain the phenomena of simultaneous coop-
eration and competition. The purpose of a coopetitive network is mutual value creation 
and individual value appropriation (Sanou, Le Roy, & Gnyawali, 2016). Czakon (2018, p. 
47) mentions that various actors are involved in network coopetition that are part of the 
value net, such as “rivals, suppliers, customers and complementors”. Gnywali et al. (2006) 
define coopetitive networks as “cooperative relationships between intra-industry play-
ers [that] contributes to the emergence of intra-industry networks” (Sanou et al., 2016, 
p. 145). Furthermore, the relationship dynamics are characterized as a mixture of trust 
and distrust with the central purpose of achieving one’s own needs. Hence, actors are 
involved in a learning race (Fernandez et al., 2014). 
 
Bengtsson et al. (2010) highlight that relationships in a network vary and consist of co-
operative and competitive connections. This leads to a coopetitive network of actors. A 
study conducted by Gnywali and Madhavan (2001) claim, not all firms have the same 
benefits from a coopetitive network, but the structural embeddedness of a firm within 
the network impacts the competitive behavior. The firm with a central position acts more 
competitive, and ”firms with higher levels of structural autonomy undertake more di-
verse competitive actions” (Gnyawali et al., 2006, p. 509). Moreover, the higher the 
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number of firms interacting in the network, the more difficult the coordination and mon-
itoring gets (Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001). 
 
Czakon (2018) assumes that the network coopetition leads to higher benefits and fea-
tures compared to dyadic coopetition. The researchers Sanou et al. (2016) conclude that 
the outcome of a coopetitive network relationship can be either a win-win or a win-lose. 
Additionally, they point out that the formation only creates temporary advantages, and 
leads to risks of asymmetric learning (Sanou et al., 2016). Even though it is important 
with whom to make the coopetitive connections, Luo (2007), also emphasizes that the 
geographical location of the global rivals can be of importance. Actors in diverse geo-
graphical locations might offer access to specific resources and opportunities, increasing 
the degree of complementarity. 
 
When firms do not have access to all necessary resources, they enter coopetitive rela-
tionships. The network theory emphasizes the cooperation and competition of multiple 
actors with the aim to have access to resources of rivals and increase performance 
(Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001). One organizational option of coopetition between mul-
tiple actors is the formation of strategic alliances. Czakon and Dana (2013), analyzed 
coopetition in the airline industry and identified four phases since the deregulation of 
the industry. First, firms formed dyadic coopetitive relationships, and later in time, they 
started to build dynamic network alliances where firms simultaneously cooperate and 
compete within and between alliances. Aforementioned, a firms position in a network 
influences the competitive market behavior (Sanou et al., 2016; Gnyawali & Madhavan, 
2001). According to Charleton et al. (2018, p. 30), this principle can also be applied to 
the position in a coopetitive alliance network. Therefore, opportunism is not constant 




2.3. Performance implications 
Coopetition has been the topic of investigation for more than a decade. However, re-
search on the relationship between coopetition and firm performance is still in its early 
stages (Le Roy & Sanou, 2014; Bouncken & Fredrich, 2012). Ritala (2018, p. 318) defines 
performance as the “firm’s financial and economic outcomes”. More specifically, it in-
cludes market share, profitability, sales growth, costs, and resource efficiency. Another 
researcher defines it as “the level/degree of goal achievement of an organization/de-
partment” (Samsonowa, 2012, p. 25). And Afuah and Tucci (2001, p. 3) define perfor-
mance as “profits, cash flow, economic value added (EVA), market valuation, earnings 
per share, sales, return on sales, return on assets, return on equity, return on capital, 
economic rents, and so on”. Venkatraman and Ramanujam (1986) distinguish between 
three categories of performance: financial performance (e.g. sales growth, profitability), 
operational performance (e.g. market-share, product quality, marketing effectiveness), 
and organizational effectiveness.  
 
A more recent definition of firm performance comes from Richard, Devinney, Yip, and 
Johnson (2009). who organize performance outcome in three different areas: “financial 
performance (profits, return on assets, return on investment, etc.); product market 
performance (sales, market share, etc.); and shareholder return (total shareholder 
return, economic value added, etc.)” (Richard et al., 2009, p. 722). In this thesis, the def-
inition “the level/degree of goal achievement of an organization/department” 
(Samsonowa, 2012, p. 25) is adopted as the central description for the term performance. 
Since this thesis examines airlines' performance in a strategic alliance, not only financial 
indicators are used but also airline-specific ones. Thus, the definition by Sasonowa allows 









financial performance (e.g. sales growth, profitability), operational 
performance (e.g. market-share, product quality, marketing 
effectivenes), and organizational effectiveness 
Afuah and Tucci (2001) 
 
profits, cash flow, economic value added (EVA), market valuation, 
earnings per share, sales, return on sales, return on assets, return 
on equity, return on capital, economic rents, and so on 
Richard et al. (2009) financial performance (profits, return on assets, return on 
investment, etc.); product market performance (sales, market share, 
etc.); and shareholder return (total shareholder return, economic 
value added, etc.) 
Samsonowa (2012) the level/degree of goal achievement of an organization/depart-
ment 
Ritala (2018) firm’s financial and economic outcomes (market share, profitability, 
sales growth, costs, and resource efficiency) 
 
The firm performance and competition aspects and cooperation have already been stud-
ied in-depth; however, mostly separately (Le Roy & Sanou, 2014; Lado, Boyd, & Hanlon, 
1997). According to the cooperation perspective, companies improve their performance 
by pursuing jointly developed goals, e.g., by pooling their resources and knowledge. Thus, 
the strategy has a positive effect through the advantage of cooperation. Contrary, from 
a competitive perspective, a firm tries to improve its performance by developing its own 
resources to gain a significant competitive advantage at its competitors’ expense. This 
strategy is only beneficial through pure aggressiveness. (Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001). 
 
Based on different researchers, separate cooperation and competition benefit a firm’s 
performance either through the advantage of cooperative or aggressive behavior. Con-
trary, coopetition strategy is a combination of both, and thus, researchers argue that it 
should lead to superior performance for firms through the benefits of both advantages 
(Bengtsson & Kock, 2000; Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996; Gnyawali & Madhavan, 
2001). However, studies on performance through the impact of coopetition have shown 
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mixed outcomes. Ritala (2012, p. 308) suggests that the success of coopetition depends 
on the industry and economy a firm is embedded in, as well as firm-specific factors. 
There is extensive evidence about the positive impact of coopetition on innovation per-
formance, which has been provided in-depth through various studies. In contrast, the 
effect on market performance has shown diverse outcomes and still lacks further re-
search. 
 
According to Bouncken and Fredrich (2011), coopetition is like a double-edged sword. 
On the one side, cooperating with rivals allows companies to improve innovation perfor-
mance, but on the other side, coopetition also leads to risks that can cause diminished 
performance. The study carried out by Bouncken and Fredrich (2011) claims that the 
effect of coopetition on performance mainly depends on trust and dependency between 
actors. Low trust leads to risks including opportunism, and possible misunderstandings 
between firms, information leaks, drift into a learning competition, inefficient allocation 
of resources, diverging strategic intentions and inefficient partners (Bouncken & Fredrich, 
2011; 2012). According to Kim and Parkhe (2009), coopetition relationships are associ-
ated with risks that can ultimately lead to the failure of the relationship. However, the 
overall effect of cooperation between competitors on the companies’ performance is 
positive despite the potential disruptions, as the coopetition enables the companies to 
access and use each other’s resources. As aforementioned, the coopetition relationship 
also enables companies to find new resources more efficiently and develop their existing 
resources even better. (Bouncken & Fredrich, 2011; 2012). 
 
Peng et al. (2012) conducted a study to investigate coopetition performance. To do so, 
they analyzed the performance of a Taiwanese supermarket for a period of 15 years. 
They conclude that performance through cooperation with competitors leads to better 
performance, at least for some time. The reason is, with coopetition more can be 
achieved, and more is possible than operating on its own. Moreover, the “adoption of 
coopetition changes the timeframe permitting the earlier achievement of higher perfor-
mance” (Peng et al., 2012, p. 547). Also, Ritala et al. (2008) investigated the performance 
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of firms in coopetitive relationships The result is that coopetition can positively impact 
firms; however, only when firms minimize cooperating with only some of their key com-
petitors. 
 
The researcher Ritala (2012) aimed to clarify the effect on innovation and market per-
formance through the coopetition strategy. For the study, 209 Finnish firms from differ-
ent industries were investigated to provide information about when coopetition is suc-
cessful and when it is not. To assess performance, Ritala bases its method on a scale 
developed by Delany and Huselid (1996). Four different variables are used: dependent 
variables, an explanatory variable, moderating variables, and two control variables (Fig-
ure 5). The dependent variables include sales growth, profitability, market share, and 
market growth. These factors are also mentioned by various researchers that defined 
performance (see Table 2) (Ritala, 2018; Richard et al., 2009; Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 
1986). 
 
The explanatory variable measures the degree of coopetition “by dividing the number 
of a firm’ alliances with competitors by its total number of alliances” (Ritala, 2012, p. 
314). The moderating variables contain market uncertainty (change in customer needs, 
competition, product demand), network externalities (increase or decrease in value of 
the product when the number of users increases), and competition intensity (similarity 
of offering to competitors, number of competitors). The control variables measure firm’s 
sales during the year that is examined and “is used to control for the size of the firm”, 
while the age gives insight into “firm’s establishment in its industry over time” (Ritala, 




Figure 5. Assessment of market performance 
 
The results show that coopetition has a positive effect on innovation and market perfor-
mance. The study also investigates coopetition in relation to market conditions. The con-
clusion is that coopetition is beneficial when market conditions are highly uncertain, 
while firms do not achieve additional value when market uncertainty is low. Another 
result is that coopetition is most advantageous to innovation and market performance 
when competition intensity is relatively low. Also, the coopetition strategy is “beneficial 
in industries with only a few major players” (Ritala, 2012, p. 319). Therefore, firms that 
select only a few key competitors to cooperate with, achieve a better innovation and 
market performance than with a high number of cooperating rivals. 
 
A recent study by Sanou et al. (2016) examines the influence of a firm’s position in a 
network on market performance. The data stems from the mobile telephone industry 
between 2000 and 2006. The previous literature on networks suggests that a firm’s po-
sition is an indicator of superior performance. A central position can lead to various ben-
efits such as access to knowledge and resources, as well as surviving external shocks. 
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position within a network can lead to increased market performance. All in all, Ritala 
(2018) has highlighted that the reason for lack of investigation in the field of coopetition 
and market performance is because of missing data. Moreover, in his paper, it is also 
pointed out that results from existing research on coopetition present a positive as well 
as negative results on firm performance. 
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3. An Overview of the Airline Industry 
In order to develop the second pillar of the theoretical background, theory about the 
airline industry must be considered. Firstly, this chapter gives a historical overview of the 
development in the airline industry. Following, the term business model is elaborated, 
and the differentiation between airline business models is presented. 
 
 
3.1. The history and future of the airline industry 
The airline industry underwent changes during the last decades, which influenced the 
way how airlines operate. In the past, the airline industry was regulated by the govern-
ment who made decisions about the frequency of flights, the entry of new carriers, the 
pricing, and the production levels. This “limited any form of price or network competi-
tion” (Cento, 2009, p. 14). The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) was re-
sponsible for regulating air transport between the two nations (Cento, 2009, p. 14). Be-
fore a National Carrier was allowed to operate in another country, the government of 
the two nations involved defined bilateral air service agreements (also known as ‘bilat-
erals’) to set the rights of operations (Doganis, 2005, p. 28). Those air service agreements 
(ASA) resulted in a strongly regulated market where entry barriers limited the number 
of carriers operating, which resulted in high ticket prices for passengers (Wang & Evans, 
2002). 
 
With the Deregulation Act in 1978, the United States was the first country that started 
to liberalize the aviation market and marks one of the most crucial events in the industry. 
The new liberal bilateral agreements are less government-controlled, allow the market 
to set prices more freely and compete more efficiently (Scharpenseel, 2001). Besides a 
domestic market liberalization, the United States demanded a less controlled interna-
tional air market agreement. In 1992, the United States and the Netherland were the 
first to liberalize bilateral Air Service Agreements, and signed an open-skies agreement 
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(Fu, Oum, & Zhang, 2010). Other countries such as Canada, Australia, and the European 
Union followed and liberalized its domestic markets. 
 
The European Union created three Aviation Liberalisation Packages that aimed at dereg-
ulating the air services within and between member states through a step approach 
(Janić, 1997). In 1987, the first agreement was adopted and marked the start of the lib-
eralization, and the second package came into force in 1990, which made the market 
less regulated. The third liberalization package in 1997 “led to the creation of a single 
European aviation market” (Lieshout, Malighetti, Redondi, & Burghouwt, 2016, p. 68). 
Since 1992, various bilateral agreements have shifted to Open-Skies agreements. Among 
others, the Open Aviation Agreement (OAA) between the European Union and the 
United States that became effective in 2008 and has created a single aviation area con-
sisting of two territories (Fu et al., 2010, p. 17). It includes that “European airlines can 
now fly without restrictions from any point in the EU to any point in the US” (Cento, 2009, 
p. 16). Other countries started negotiating with the aim to liberalize further the interna-
tional airline market (Fu et al., 2010). 
 
The increasing liberalization nationally and internationally has resulted in multiple 
changes in the aviation industry. The open skies agreements and loosely defined air ser-
vice agreements revolutionized the whole industry and have increased competition in 
the markets (Fu & Oum, 2014). The era between 1994 and 2000 is marked by a growth 
of flag carriers and the hub system (Burghouwt & de Wit, 2015). Moreover, airlines have 
increased their frequency and implemented more routes as well as created frequent flier 
programs (Cento, 2009, pp. 14-15). Additionally, with an increase in carriers operating, 
the overall traffic volume and airline efficiency have increased (Fu et al., 2010). By re-
moving price restrictions, airlines need to emphasize optimization and strategic decision-
making due to low and aggressive pricing of competition (Lieshout et al., 2016). The open 
aviation area allows airlines to operate freely across European countries and primarily 
benefits dominant airlines that can strengthen their market position. Furthermore, the 
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effect of the open aviation area in Europe is that the number of passengers rapidly in-
creased, resulting from competitive prices and the high number of destinations offered. 
 
When the industry was still regulated, flag-scheduled carriers accounted for the official 
national carrier and received government protection and coverage of loss (Janić, 1997). 
In comparison, non-flag airlines that appeared later in time were privately owned and 
did not benefit from government protection nor reached the size of the flag airlines 
(Janić, 1997). Through the liberalization, government protection is limited, and the in-
crease in traffic volume and competition caused a rise in airlines along with bankruptcies 
and mergers. Furthermore, another business model emerged through the deregulation 
and focused on low ticket prices by operating from secondary airports. According to Do-
bruszkes (2009), large airlines that served as its national carriers, such as KLM, British 
Airways, or Lufthansa, did not benefit directly from the liberalization. 
 
The low-cost business model first emerged in the United States pioneered by Southwest 
Airlines. Therefore, growing competition and a decrease in prices are also called the 
“Southwest effect” (Fu & Oum, 2014, p. 19). The era of Low-cost carriers (LCC) was from 
2001 to 2013, where the business model has become an intense competition for full-
service carriers (FSC) due to the fact that they operate on the same routes but price more 
aggressively (Burghouwt & de Wit, 2015). The aforementioned is possible because first, 
they only served from secondary airports due to the lower airport charges, but recently 
started to operate also from primary airports (Lieshout et al., 2016). With its low fees, 
the business model makes it attractive for travelers to choose the low-cost provider over 
traditional carriers (Cento, 2009). 
 
The consequences of the growth of low-cost carriers are that traffic volume has risen 
steeply, whereas the price level is continuously falling (Fu et al., 2010). Moreover, it 
caused a wave of mergers in the United States, resulting in three big merger blocks: 
United Airlines, Delta, and American Airlines (Bilotkach, 2019). Even after the September 
11 attacks in 2001, the whole airline industry faced a severe crisis where passenger 
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numbers declined, and many companies went bankrupt. Instead, the low-cost carrier 
market did not experience any negative impact but continued to grow (Larsen, Gillick, & 
Sweeney, 2012, p. 1262). In 2008, the financial crisis affected the whole economy and 
led many companies to close, including airlines. That was a second-deep downturn after 
the 9/11 attacks. The crisis changed peoples’ travel behavior who tend to travel less by 
air or choose cheaper alternatives. One cheaper alternative was the low-cost carriers 
that experienced a boom during this time, whereas network carriers underwent great 
losses (Goyal & Negi, 2014). Therefore, several traditional network carriers have adopted 
some aspects of the low cost business model, while others launched their own low-cost 
subsidiary to stay competitive (Lieshout et al., 2016). 
 
Based on Statista, the number of passengers traveling by plane has grew substantially 
over the last 15 years (Mazareanu, 2020). In the year 2004, the number of passengers 
was 1.99 billion, and in 2007 already 2.45 billion people traveled through the air. During 
the year 2008 and especially 2009, the number did not increase, leading to the financial 
crisis. However, from 2010 onwards, the passenger numbers went up again, and in 2013, 
around 3.14 billion boarded a plane. In 2019, the number of passengers reached 4.54 
billion. The reasons for air travel growth are the low-cost business model that offers 
cheap fare, air infrastructure development, as well as a larger middle class (Mazareanu, 
2020). 
 
The future and the external factors in such a dynamic industry are not foreseeable, and 
challenges are continuously faced. “Change can be sudden and overwhelming, or grad-
ual and unnoticed; in either case, the result can be hard to manage – and sometimes 
fatal – for organizations not actively preparing for it” (International Air Transport 
Association, 2018, p. 1). Technology and digitalization have changed the industry in the 
past. And new and innovative ways is a tool to attract customers. Therefore, airlines 
have been focusing on more advanced technological processes to stay ahead, which will 
be an ongoing trend in the next few years (International Air Transport Association, 2018). 
Another current trend is the consolidation of airlines. According to a report by KMPG 
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(2018), consolidation could increase, and small airlines would not be able to stay com-
petitive. They state, “Europe is a mature aviation market, which is considered to be in 
the early stages of a wave of consolidation that is expected to continue for the near term” 
(KPMG, 2018, p. 27). All in all, consolidation could result in a more stable airline economy 
in the long term. 
 
One external event that has had an enormous influence on the airline industry is the 
COVID-19 pandemic. The crisis started to hit the industry in March 2020 and caused 
airlines to keep their fleet on the ground. According to the IATA (2020), the European 
airlines are at a loss of $21.5 billion in 2020. Moreover, passenger demand was reduced 
by more than half. Airlines, especially larger-sized companies, can get financial aid from 
their country, however, in the form of loans that need to be paid back. Thus, it puts a 
stop to new service investments, inflating employment numbers, and new aircrafts 
(IATA, 2020). Since the COVID-19 crisis is ongoing, it is unpredictable how the airline 
industry will develop because each airline is now concentrating on its own business to 
gain stability again. 
 
Table 3. Key events in the Airline Industry 
Year Event 
1978 Deregulation Act in the United States 
1987 European Union adopted first agreement of three aviation liberali-
zation packages 
1990 Second liberalization package came into force in which made the 
market less regulated 
1992 The United States and the Netherland were the first to liberalize bi-
lateral Air Service Agreements and signed an open-skies agreement 
1997 third liberalization package which led to the creation of a single Eu-
ropean aviation market 
Since 1992 Various bilateral agreements shifted to Open-Skies agreements 
1994-2000 Growth of flag carriers, creation of strategic alliances 
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2008 Creation of the Open Aviation Agreement (OAA) between the Euro-
pean Union and the United States and has created a single aviation 
area 
2001 The September 11 attacks lead to an airline crisis with low passenger 
numbers and companies going bankrupt 
2001-2013 The era of the Low Cost Carrier 
2010 Mergers in the US airline market 




3.2. Airline business models 
The term “business model” first appeared in 1957 in an academic article but only has 
gained significant attention in the mid-1990s (Osterwalder, Pigneur, & Tucci, 2005). The 
growing significance of the concept can be linked to the emergence of the internet boom, 
e-commerce, as well as the low-cost carriers (Amit & Zott, 2001; Sengur & Sengur, 2017). 
While the term grew of importance and businesses more frequently used it, it became 
clear that the phrase has been used to describe multiple meanings (Osterwalder et al., 
2005). Various researchers state that it is difficult to find only one definition that de-
scribes business models due to the fact that the term has been viewed from diverse 
perspectives (Goyal, Kapoor, Esposito, & Sergi, 2017). Furthermore, Porter (2001, p. 73) 
states that “the definition of a business model is murky at best. Most often, it seems to 
refer to a loose conception of how a company does business and generates revenue”. 
 
The article by Goyal et al. (2017, p. 103) points out key research areas of business models. 
Those research trends are definition, typologies, business model versus strategy, com-
ponents and frameworks, emerging markets, metrics and leadership, innovation, and 
theoretical dimensions. Table 1 shows several definitions of the term business model, 
which indicate variance and transformation throughout the last years. One of the first 
researchers who attempted to classify the expression was Timmers (1998, p. 4), who 
denotes that a business model is a source of revenue and can acts as an “architecture 
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for the product, service and information flows, including a description of the various 
business actors and their roles“. Amit and Zott (2001, p. 511) focused their research on 
analyzing e-businesses and concluded that “a business model depicts the content, struc-
ture, and governance of transactions designed so as to create value through the exploi-
tation of business opportunities”. 
 
After the emergence of the term, most research about business models has been done 
concerning e-business, aviation, and Information technology, while later analysis cen-
tralized a more generic approach. Overall, most definitions focus either on the source of 
revenue, while other researchers emphasize the value proposition or means of product 
supply. A significant contribution comes from Magretta (2002, p. 92), who implies that 
the appearance of a new business model reshapes the industry. If it is hard to imitate, it 
can lead to creating a competitive advantage for the firm. Shafer, Smith and Linder (2005) 
examined several definitions to form one description that covers crucial characteristics. 
They define a business model as “a representation of a firm’s underlying core logic and 
strategic choices for creating and capturing value within a value network” (Shafer, Smith, 
& Linder, 2005). Furthermore, Osterwalder et al. (2005) describe a business model as an 
architecture that makes the business work and consists of multiple actors that form a 
network. The definition by Shafer et al. (2005) is further used as the central description 
for business models in this thesis. 
 
A new form of business model emerged beginning from the year 2009. It is the open 
business model that centralizes the collaboration with outside actors. Frankenberger, 
Weiblen, & Gassmann (2013, p. 672) define the open business model as “value creation 
and value capture of a focal firm, whereby externally sourced activities contribute signif-
icantly to value creation”. During the last years, firms realized the need for a more sus-
tainable economy. Therefore, the circular economy emerged and “is essentially an envi-
ronmental change in response to the global need for an ecological economy” (Lahti, 
Wincent, & Parida, 2018, p. 3). It consists of three R’s principles: reduce, reuse, and re-
cycle. Lahti et al. (2018, p. 3) define it as a business model that is “is designed to create 
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and capture value while helping achieve an ideal state of resource usage”. The linear 
economy follows the take, make, dispose approach resulting in a high amount of waste. 
The profits are made through the sale of products, while the circular economy centralizes 
the profit generation through the flow of resources (Ellen MacArthur Foundation, 2014). 
 
Table 4. Business model definitions 
Article Definition 
Timmers (1998) An architecture for the product, service and information flows, in-
cluding a description of the various business actors and their roles. 
A description of the potential benefits for the various business ac-
tors. A description of the sources of revenues 
Amit and Zott (2001) A business model depicts the content, structure, and governance of 
transactions designed so as to create value through the exploitation 
of business opportunities 
Afuah and Tucci (2001) Method by which a firm builds and uses its resources to offer its 




The method of doing business by which a company can sustain it-
self—that is, generate revenue. 
How a company makes money by specifying where it is positioned 
in the value chain. 
Magretta (2002) Stories that explain how enterprises work 
Shafer et al. (2005) A representation of a firm’s underlying core logic and strategic 
choices for creating and capturing value within a value network 
Osterwalder et al. (2005) A conceptual tool that contains a set of elements and their relation-
ships and allows expressing the business logic of a specific firm. It is 
a description of the value a company offers to one or several seg-
ments of customers and of the architecture of the firm and its net-
work of partners for creating, marketing, and delivering this value 
and relationship capital, to generate profitable and sustainable rev-
enue streams 
Osterwalder and Pigneur 
(2010) 
blueprint for a strategy to be implemented through organisation 
structures, processes and systems 
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Frankenberger et al. (2013) An open business model explains value creation and value capture 
of a focal firm, whereby externally sourced activities contribute sig-
nificantly to value creation  
Lahti et al. (2018) A circular business model is designed to create and capture value 
while helping achieve an ideal state of resource usage 
 
A business model describes how a firm creates, captures, and delivers value from a set 
of resources or services (Osterwalder, Pigneur, & Tucci, 2005; Richardson, 2008; Pisano, 
2019). Nowadays, the term is utilized extensively and often used interchangeably with 
strategy. However, a business model and strategy are not identical (Magretta, 2002; 
Shafer et al., 2005). While a business model describes how the elements fit together, a 
strategy focuses on competition and includes how to dominate the game and how to be 
better than the competition either through cost leadership or differentiation (Porter, 
2001; Magretta, 2002). A link between the business model and strategy was made by 
Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010, p. 14), who state that a business model is a “blueprint 
for a strategy to be implemented through organisation structures, processes and sys-
tems“. 
 
Researchers have classified different components and elements that are essential for a 
business model. According to a study by Shafer et al. (2005, p. 202), they identified four 
primary components of a business model, which are strategic choices, creative value, 
value network, and capture value. Alternative parts of business models are given by var-
ious authors, which vary in their number and content. Timmers (1998) mentions five 
elements that focus on e-commerce, Afuah and Tucci (2001) come up with eight compo-
nents, and Chesbrough and Rosenbloom (2002) summarize six vital functions from a gen-
eral perspective. Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010) analyzed different definitions and con-
cluded that a business model could be best described through building blocks. Their 
framework is named “business model canvas” and proclaims to be “simple, relevant, and 
intuitively understandable, while not oversimplifying the complexities of how enter-
prises function” (Osterwalder & Pigneur, 2010, p. 15). The nine-building blocks are 
among the most accepted concepts and consist of value proposition, customer segment, 
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channels, customer relationship, key resources, key activities, key partners, cost struc-
ture, and revenue streams. The components cover four primary areas of business and 
have the purpose of connecting areas of the organization: product, customer, infrastruc-
ture, and financial infrastructure (Osterwalder & Pigneur, 2010). 
 
When looking at the airline industry, it can be challenging to distinguish between airline 
business models, especially when considering the dynamic nature of the sector (Mason 
& Morrison, 2008). Aforementioned, a business model’s objective is to create value, and 
to offer the right product or service to customers. Hence, airline business models give 
inside about the operation and how value is created for stakeholders (Sengur & Sengur, 
2017, p. 146). Therefore, value chain activities, and product offerings for the specific 
target market need to be configurated to match the business model (Vatankhah, Zarra-
Nezhad, & Amirnejad, 2019). The airline industry consists of four broad business model 
categories: Full-service carriers (FSC), Low-cost carriers (LCC), charter, and regional 
(Doganis, 2005; Gillen & Gados, 2008). However, in this paper, the focus is on full-service 
carriers, also known as network carriers. 
 
Various researchers have studied airline business models and their differences, how 
they create and capture value as well as create a competitive advantage. According to 
Gillen and Gados (2008), one strategic difference between a full-service and low-cost 
carrier is that a FSC has a broader geographic area while the LCC operates on short-haul 
routes. During the last two decades, the low-cost business model has developed new 
ways in earning money and attract customers, primarily through low fares that can be 
enabled through the abandoning of additional services that the FSC provides (Gillen & 
Gados, 2008; Vidović, Štimac, & Vince, 2013). Furthermore, Wensveen and Leick (2009) 
contributed to the research on airline business models and identified 17 features that 
characterize low-cost and full-service carriers. The product features include aircraft us-
age, airport, Check-in, class segmentation, connection, customer service, fleet, frequent 
flyer program, target group, and turnaround time (Wensveen & Leick, 2009, p. 132). 
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Equally important is the study by Bieger and Wittmer (2006), who compared and identi-
fied success factors of business models. Based on their research, the success factor of 
network carriers is the extensive market coverage and the belonging to a strategic alli-
ance. In contrast, low-cost carriers have an advantage through simple processes, cost 
efficiency, and strong traffic flows. Moreover, FSCs are driven by market share, compared 
to LCCs, which are driven by routes (Bieger & Wittmer, 2006). Additionally, it is assumed 
that customers make decisions about the airline based on price and schedule (Karwowski, 
2015), as well as market access, which includes the geographic coverage and frequency 
(Gillen & Gados, 2008). Another contribution to the research on the topic comes from 
Mason and Morrison (2008), who develop a product and organizational architecture 
(POA) to compare airline business models and their key elements. One main finding 
shows that business models and strategies, especially among low-cost carriers, vary 
widely. 
 
The full-service business model provides a wide range of services on board, including 
meals, drinks, and in-flight entertainment. They also offer different seating classes (Econ-
omy, Business, and First Class) and connecting flights (Vidović et al., 2013). A unique as-
pect of full-service carriers is belonging to a strategic alliance, which allows the airline to 
take advantage of code sharing and interlining (Bieger & Wittmer, 2006). The authors 
Vidović et al. (2013, p. 71) highlight in their paper that network carriers focus on hub-
and-spoke connections (HS) due to the fact that “as the number of destinations is grow-
ing, so does the aircraft load factor, resulting in lower unit costs per passenger. If higher 
demand justifies the use of larger aircraft, the unit costs per seat also drop” (Vidović et 
al., 2013, p. 71). 
 
The hub and spoke model is an important logistical system for FSCs, which connects a 
primary airport with a vast amount of small regions (Gillen & Gados, 2008). Based on the 
data, it can be explained why full-service carriers have a more diverse aircraft fleet. They 
use large aircrafts such as Boeing 747, and Airbus 380 between hub airports, contrary, 
smaller aircrafts are used between spoke and hub airports since the passenger load is 
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lower (Cento, 2008). According to Cook and Goodwin (2008, p. 53), HS structure has the 
advantage that fewer routes are needed to reach a destination because it is possible to 
fly “from anywhere to everywhere”. Through the hub-and-spoke structure, airlines can 
have an advantage in economies of scale, economies of scope, and economies of density. 
Economies of scope is achieved through the combination of passengers from multiple 
spoke cities in one aircraft that operates between the hub and the destination. Whereas, 
economies of density is reached by bundling flights to increase cost savings (Cento, 2009, 
p. 29). However, Franke (2004) emphasizes that this strategy also has negative aspects 
such as inconvenience for passengers, waves of high traffic volume at the airport, and 
risky connection times. 
 
The full-service business model has complex yield management, which is about selling 
the right seat to the right customer at the right time for the right price to fill the aircraft. 
Donovan (2005, p. 12) elaborates that it is about managing the supply (number of seats) 
and the demand by increasing the price per seat when the demand is high and decreas-
ing the rate when the demand is low. Different sales channels are used, which can be 
direct or indirect and either online or offline. Intermediate travel agencies perform indi-
rect offline sales, and indirect online sales are conducted through electronic agents. The 
direct offline purchase can be made by calling the airline or airline city offices. In contrast, 
direct online sale is made by purchasing tickets on the airline’s official website (Cento, 
2009, p. 19). 
 
In recent years there has been considerable interest in the business model “Low-Cost 
Carrier”. It was first implemented in the United States in the 1970s by the airline south-
west. In 1991, Ryanair, a former full-service carrier, was the first airline that copied the 
business model and applied it in the European market (Fu et al., 2010; Doganis, 2005). 
The low-cost business model achieves a competitive advantage through its strategy, 
which differs from full-service carriers by delivering “a unique value mix” (Gillen & Gados, 
2008, p. 28). Gillen and Gados (2008) point out that the business model has a competi-
tive advantage in terms of costs compared to FSCs since no in-flight services such as 
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meals or drinks are offered for free. Moreover, the class segmentation is kept simple, 
and in the earlier years, no frequent flyer programs were offered (Cento, 2009, pp. 19-
20). Low-cost carriers focus on point-to-point (PP) networks with direct routes to the 
destination. A significant advantage of PP connections is a decrease in delays since there 
are no incoming “spoke flights” with delayed passengers and luggage for which the air-
craft has to wait (Lordan, 2014). 
 
Preliminary work reported that the low-cost model focuses mainly on secondary airports 
where the turnaround time is less than 30 minutes. The fees for slots are lower, which 
leads to higher aircraft utilization and helps the airline achieve economies of density 
(Doganis, 2005). However, more recent evidence (Burghouwt & de Wit, 2015), reveals 
that since the last years, low cost airlines increasingly move to hub airports. Moreover, 
the business model mainly uses the aircraft model Boeing 737 and Airbus 320 that hold 
a capacity of around 190 seats and fit to short and medium-haul flights (Vidović et al., 
2013). Doing so, the LCC saves costs in training employees for various aircraft types and 
simplifying the storage of spare parts (Dobruszkes, 2009). Additionally, the sales channel 
is simplified by cutting out the intermediaries and only focusing on direct sales via the 
internet and phone. The confirmation and travel information of the purchase is directly 
sent via email (Cento, 2009, p. 20). 
 
A recent review of literature on airline business models found out that some full-service 
carriers developed a way to respond to the threat of low-cost carriers. The competition 
between the two airline business models has increased over the last years, especially 
through the aggressive low-cost carriers that pressure full-service carriers to reduce 
costs, change their strategy and improve their efficiency (Pearson & Merkert, 2014). 
Therefore, in the last few years, various full-service operators have added a segment to 
their portfolio of business models (Hunter, 2006; Pearson & Merkert, 2014). These air-
lines operate with their premium brand, the full-service model, between hubs. Addition-
ally, they compete with their own low-cost carrier to remain a player in the airline indus-
try (Karwowski, 2015). 
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3.3. Strategic Alliances in the airline industry 
Strategic alliances can be defined as an “agreement between two or more organizations 
to cooperate in a specific business activity, so that each benefits from the strengths of 
the other, and gains competitive advantage” (Išoraitė, 2009, p. 39). Mockler et al. (1997, 
p. 250) describe a strategic alliance as “two or more firms that unite to pursue a set of 
agreed-upon goals remain independent subsequent to the formation of the alliance”. 
Moreover, Gulati (1998, p. 293) characterizes the relationship as “voluntary agreements 
between firms involving exchange, sharing, or co-development of products, technologies, 
or services”. Oum et al. (2000, pp. 4-5) define airline alliances as “a long-term partner-
ship of two or more firms that attempt to enhance their advantages collectively vis-à-vis 
their competitor by sharing scarce resources including brand assets and market access 
capabilities, enhancing service quality, and thereby improving profitability”. All in all, the 
collection of definitions on strategic (airline) alliances mainly centralizes the voluntary 
agreement to work with one or more actors to share various resources while remaining 
independent. In this thesis, the definition by Mockler et al. (1997, p. 250) is adopted as 
the primary description of the concept of strategic alliances. It is chosen because it cen-
tralizes the independence of each firm even after the formation of the alliance. 
 
Table 5. Definitions of strategic alliances 
Article Definition 
Mockler et al. (1997) “two or more firms that unite to pursue a set of agreed-upon goals 
remain independent subsequent to the formation of the alliance” 
Gutali (1998) “voluntary agreements between firms involving exchange, sharing, 
or co-development of products, technologies, or services” 
Oum et al. (2000) “a long-term partnership of two or more firms that attempt to en-
hance their advantages collectively vis-à-vis their competitor by 
sharing scarce resources including brand assets and market access 
capabilities, enhancing service quality, and thereby improving prof-
itability” 
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Išoraitė (2009) “agreement between two or more organizations to cooperate in a 
specific business activity, so that each benefits from the strengths of 
the other, and gains competitive advantage” 
 
The airline industry contains three main multi-partner alliances: Star Alliance, oneworld, 
and SkyTeam (Table 6). “Such alliances are horizontal and therefore coopetition relation-
ships where airlines are competing on some aspects and cooperating on other” 
(Gudmundsson & Lechner, 2006, p. 153). It is the most common form of alliance and a 
non-equity holding variety (Gudergan, Devinney, Richter, & Ellis, 2012). While airlines 
within an alliance cooperate and compete simultaneously with each other, the alliance 
also competes against other alliances like a single actor (Gudmundsson & Lechner, 2006). 
Moreover, an airline that is a member of one alliance cannot simultaneously belong to 
another alliance (Fan, Vigeant-Langlois, Geissler, Bosler, & Wilmking, 2001). 
 
Table 6. Three main strategic airline alliances 
Feature Star Alliance oneworld SkyTeam 
Date of formation 1997 1999 2000 
Headquarter Frankfurt, Germany New York City, USA Amsterdam, Netherlands 
Number of Airlines 26 (see Appendix 1) 13 (see Appendix 2) 19 (see Appendix 3) 
Countries served 195 170 170 
Destinations 1,300 1,000 1,036 
Fleet 5,013 3,300 3,054 
Employees 431,500 360,000 n/d 
Total revenue US$ 179 billion 142 billion 152 billion 
Annual passengers 762,27 million 535 million 676 million 
Market share 21,7% 15,6% 16,1% 
(Star Alliance, 2019; oneworld, 2020; SkyTeam, 2020; Mazareanu, 2019) 
 
The importance of these strategic airline alliances occurred after the deregulation of the 
airline industry (Mockler et al., 1997). This is because they help to reduce costs since 
operational facilities are shared. Moreover, “long intercontinental flights need one or 
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more stop and require an interline journey provided by different airlines” (Cento, 2009, 
p. 15). That is not possible by one airline alone or would be time and cost consuming. 
Therefore, alliances have been increasingly used to stay competitive against the low-cost 
business model, which has become a serious rival. Various studies highlight that full-
service carriers consolidate with their rivals to remain competitive. Especially during the 
last years, the airline industry has been under pressure due to the steadily growing num-
ber of airlines, overcapacity, and price competition (Zank, Chammem and Stäblein, 2018). 
As Zank et al. (2018, p. 3) point out, “the industry imbalance will not only hit the short-
haul market […] but also the long-haul routes”. This leads to the growing number of 
airline mergers and alliance formations with other full-service carriers to stay competi-
tive and share costs. 
 
Gudmundsson and Lechner (2006) highlight that airlines with unique resources have an 
advantage in alliances, which also emphasizes the resource-based view. The uniqueness 
in resources enables airlines to fill structural holes, which is “unserved space in a net-
work that can be exploited as a result of brokering connections between disconnected 
segments generating social capital” (Gudmundsson & Lechner, 2006, p. 154). Moreover, 
airlines that do not have a central position within a network should look for opportuni-
ties where the resources are unique, leading to a more central position. Gudmundsson 
and Lechner (2006) use the example of Finnair, who joined the strategic alliance of one-
world rather than Star Alliance due to the fact that the Scandinavian airline SAS is already 
a member of that alliance. This would lead to overcapacity of geographical coverage and 
fewer opportunities for a central position. 
 
One of the most critical assets of an airline is the customer base. The entry of an airline 
in a multi-partner alliance leads to the fact that member airlines can take advantage of 
the customers due to the same frequent flyer program. According to Gudmundsson and 
Lechner (2006, p. 157) “joining an alliance could mean that airlines lose some control 
over their most important assets by making them accessible to the other members of 
the alliance”. Therefore, airlines with extensive customer network could have fewer 
 55 
incentives in joining an alliance. Another essential asset is the route network, which can 
also be exploited by members when entering an alliance. And sharing the connections 
with other airlines in the alliance can also lead to loss of control and in gaining less from 
the coopetition relationship than members (Gudmundsson & Lechner, 2006). Also, 
Doganis (2005, p. 279) mentions that airlines need to analyze the benefits for one own 
and the partners. It could lead to the conclusion that the alliance would create imbalance 
and that “one partner feels it is getting much less out of the alliance than the other part-
ner(s)” (Doganis, 2005, p. 279). 
 
Klophaus and Lordan (2018) analyzed the vulnerability of the three largest airline alli-
ances in case an airline would exit the alliance. This would lead to the deletion of routes 
if not covered by another member airline. The study’s findings are that oneworld is the 
most vulnerable alliance, followed by SkyTeam and Star Alliance. Moreover, they point 
out that the schedule size of the airline is not necessarily important for the strength of 
the network but whether or not the routes are covered by another member airline. For 
example, Klophaus and Lordan (2018) mention that an exit of American carriers would 
greatly impact an alliance vulnerability because numerous routes would get lost. 
 
After coopetition in the previous chapter and focusing on strategic alliances in this sec-
tion, it is important to clarify the differences between the terms. Coopetition and stra-
tegic alliances are often misused and treated as they were synonym concepts. Coopeti-
tion describes the collaboration of competing firms. A strategic alliance on the other 
hand “a long-term partnership of two or more firms that attempt to enhance their ad-
vantages” (Oum et al., 2000, p. 4). With regards to strategic alliances, they can be 
formed by any actors, either competitors or non-competitors. Moreover, it needs to be 
distinguished between a vertical and horizontal strategic alliance. A vertical strategic al-
liance is formed, for example, by suppliers and buyers, and is not connected to coopeti-




3.3.1. Potential benefits 
There are several advantages when forming a strategic alliance with other companies 
from the industry. The involved companies can penetrate new foreign markets and new 
customer bases (Kale & Singh, 2009; Brueckner, 2001). It is especially valuable in today’s 
fast-changing world where entering single markets and building relationships with cus-
tomers takes a long time. Therefore, being part of an international strategic alliance is 
an alternative to achieve fast access to new markets and new customers (Pels, 2001). 
The partnership “can make the expansion into unfamiliar territory a lot easier and less 
stressful” (Elmuti and Kathawala, 2001: 206). Entering a new market is often connected 
with uncertainty, especially in unstable markets and airlines face risks in introducing new 
routes. The benefits of a multi-partner alliance are that “through code-sharing, joint net-
work coverage and joint marketing initiatives (such as frequent flyer programmes), air-
lines are able to increase their utilization rates and offer an increased number of desti-
nations” without taking the risks of low demand on those routes (Tjemkes, Burgers, & 
Vos, 2012, p. 229). A code-sharing agreement refers to an “airline who operates the flight 
allows the partner airline to also sell seats on their flight” (Goetz & Shapiro, 2012, p. 
736). 
 
Another aspect is that a diversified route network, convenient slots, and good connec-
tivity are always related to high investments. Those costs can be shared and spread 
among the other partners when forming a strategic alliance (Gudmundsson & Lechner, 
2006; Brueckner, 2001; Pels, 2001). Another factor in favor of a strategic alliance is that 
the airlines can share knowledge and expertise, which “can range from learning to deal 
with government regulations, product knowledge, or learning how to acquire resources” 
(Išoraitė, 2009, p. 42). Since many firms develop competencies in a particular area but 
lack expertise in others, knowledge sharing can lead to another benefit, which is the 
achievement of competitive advantage towards other airlines (Russo and Cesarani, 
2017). This leads to a decrease in “risk of market entry, international expansion, research 
and development” (Išoraitė, 2009, p. 42). Therefore, forming a strategic alliance has the 
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advantage of sharing risks and significant investments. By entering a strategic alliance 
with another firm, those financial risks can be reduced (Išoraitė, 2009). 
 
The multi-partner alliances create benefits for customers as well as members. According 
to Pels (2001), customers can take advantage of one frequent flyer program for all air-
lines within one alliance, as well as access to lounges, and better flight connectivity. 
Brueckner (2001, p. 1476) explains that “each carrier’s network seem like an extension 
of its partner’s route system, the airlines collaborate to provide ‘seamless’ service”. Also, 
Fan et al. (2001, p. 350) highlight the smooth connection between airlines during flights 
and state that airlines are “delivering ‘‘seamless’’ travel experience across the entire al-
liance network”. The seamless service also leads to the impression that customers travel 
on a single airline rather than multiple ones (Brueckner, 2001). Moreover, the code-shar-
ing leads to lower fares for transfer flights. Airlines can also increase their value through 
the alliance by exploiting the uniqueness of each airline, such as destinations or “multi-
ple centers of gravity” (Gudmundsson & Lechner, 2006, p. 155). 
 
There are various services that airlines from the same alliance as other airlines can take 
advantage of, such as schedule coordination, baggage handling, ground maintenance, 
slot sharing, and joint marketing (Weber, 2005). Weber (2005) conducted a study to an-
alyze what travelers value most about strategic airline alliances. The outcome was that 
the participants mainly value the increase in comfort and convenience, such as “the ease 
of transfers between flights, smoother baggage handling, and one- stop check-in” as well 
as the support in case of problems (Weber, 2005, p. 260). The study also concluded that 
the loyalty programs and the growth in route networks are less attractive. 
 
3.3.2. Potential drawbacks 
A Strategic alliance is an agreement that most airlines use to take advantage of compet-
itors and access their resources that would not be possible to reach on their own. How-
ever, it is not clear yet that strategic alliances create value for an airline. Code sharing is 
a simple form of alliance and can bring benefits to an airline, as mentioned in the 
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previous section. However, code sharing leads to a number of considerable challenges 
for an airline and its passengers. The researchers Min and Joo (2016) point out several 
critical aspects of code share agreements. First, code sharing can cause confusion and 
uncertainty for passengers because they do not exactly know which airline will operate 
their flight. Moreover, it “forces the passengers to change their planes at different gates 
in connecting airports with additional security checkpoints and thus increases hassles 
for confused passengers” (Min & Joo, 2016, p. 100). 
 
Second, code sharing can lead to route monopolies by one airline where passengers have 
no alternative options and are bound to the price and schedule of that one airline. Also, 
Elmuti and Kathawala (2001) highlight that strategic alliances can cause market isolation 
due to the presence of the other partner. As mentioned earlier, different services can be 
used by all members of the alliance and, thus, create benefits. However, these benefits 
of shared services can also lead to potential challenges. The researchers Min and Joo 
(2016) summarize that “code sharing complicates airline branding strategy, service dif-
ferentiation strategy, pricing strategy, flight scheduling/routing, baggage handling, and 
frequent flyer reward systems.” 
 
The members of a strategic alliance share a joint governance structure, limiting decision-
making autonomy. Moreover, an airline in a strategic alliance might face interdepend-
ence and loss of flexibility (Min & Joo, 2016). Since a strategic airline alliance is a multi-
partner formation, it is possible that some members may take advantage of a free-riding 
behavior. “Free-riding occurs when partners act opportunistically by not contributing to 
the alliance, while benefiting unequally from the outcomes of the alliance” (Tjemkes et 
al., 2012, p. 240). All in all, the increased complexity due to multiple firms involved can 
lead to inefficiency as well as coordination problems (Tjemkes et al., 2012). Therefore, it 




Figure 6. Summary: Benefits and Drawbacks of Strategic Alliances 
 
 
3.4. Performance in the airline industry 
The existing literature on performance in the airline industry is still limited. According to 
Gulati (1998), the performance of alliances has not been studied intensively due to the 
difficulty of measuring performance and collecting the required data for the study. Exist-
ing studies give no consensus on whether the formation of alliances leads to benefits for 
airlines. (Kuzminykh & Zufan, 2012). A study conducted by Min and Joo (2016, p. 109) 
examined “whether the code sharing practices as part of strategic alliances among air-
lines could be translated into the alliance participants' competitive advantage”. The 
study’s outcome is that an alliance’s potential benefits, such as cost savings through 
economies of scale, are not enough to increase an airlines’ competitiveness. Another 
result is that an alliance does not necessarily improve the operating efficiency however, 
cost-saving is indeed achieved through alliances (Min & Joo, 2016). 
 
Even though most airlines belong to one of the three strategic alliances, several airlines 
are not members of any of those formations. According to the study by Min and Joo 
(2016), there is no change in airline performance before and after joining the alliance. 
The study by Min and Joo (2016) provides already results about whether or not an airline 
- New foreign markets and new 
customer bases
- Lower uncertainty and risks
- Increased market coverage
- Shared costs
- Share knowledge and expertise
- Passengers: frequent flyer 
program, access to lounges, and 
better flight connectivity
- Exploiting uniqueness of each 
airline
- Shared services
- Code sharing: confusion and 
uncertainty for passengers 
- Passengers change planes in 
connecting airports 
- Route monopolies 
- Code sharing complicates services
- Limit decision making autonomy





can improve its performance through coopetition. However, it needs to be considered 
that the study is based on data until the year 2010 and therefore, does not provide reli-
ability that the outcome would still be the same in the year 2020. This is because the 
airline industry is dynamic and constantly changing, especially over the last few years. 
Moreover, the analyzed variables are rather limited and vary to the ones that other re-
searchers used for their analysis (Gudmundsson & Lechner, 2006). Furthermore, re-
searchers highlight the importance of the actor’s position within a network that has an 
impact on the performance (Gudmundsson & Lechner, 2006). Also, the uniqueness of 
resources that create a competitive advantage is essential for an airlines performance. 
 
According to Park and Cho (1997), market share is one of the most important perfor-
mance indicators and can be used as reasoning for the choice of strategy. Moreover, to 
measure the performance of airlines, specific industry indicators can be used. Park and 
Cho (1997) used revenue passenger miles (RPM) as a performance indicator. Also, the 
International Air Transport Association (IATA) conducts studies of the aviation industry 
on a regular base and uses revenue passenger kilometers (RPK) and available seat kilo-
meters (ASK) as measurements (IATA, 2019). Those are among the most common terms 
to measure passenger airline traffic. RPK indicates the number of kilometers that paying 
passengers traveled. The outcome of the calculation gives information on the market 
demand. Additionally, ASK provides information on the passenger-carrying capacity. 
(Belobaba, Odoni, & Barnhart, 2015, p. 397). 
 
Strategic alliances have been a form of cooperation and offer numerous benefits. Also, 
most of the network carriers belong to an alliance, one exception being, for example, 
Emirates (Bilotkach, 2019). Bilotkach (2019) highlights that another form of cooperation 
between airlines has grown in popularity. It is noticed that during the last decade, pri-
marily joint ventures have been used increasingly. A joint venture is the “closest thing 
that the airlines could have to a merger in the current institutional and regulatory envi-
ronment” (Bilotkach, 2019, p. 52). 
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3.5. Summarizing the theoretical framework of the master’s thesis 
This section summarizes the theoretical framework and presents the model that helps 
to study the impact of coopetition in the form of strategic alliances on airlines’ market 
performance. The model in Figure 7 can be used as a base for the empirical analysis. It 
is developed from the existing literature reviewed and presented in the previous chap-
ters of this thesis. 
 
In the theoretical chapters, I explained the concept of coopetition and acknowledged 
three theories that explain the reason for forming relationships with competitors. The 
resource-based view emphasizes that firms are building relationships with rivals to ac-
cess unique resources (Bengtsson & Kock, 2000). The resource dependence theory 
claims that firms do not have access to all resources required and, therefore, form inter-
organizational relationships to reduce the dependence on external resources (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978, p. 41). And the network theory points out that firms form relationships 
with multiple partners to create mutual value and individual value appropriation (Sanou 
et al., 2016). However, coopetition has its benefits and challenges. On one side, cooper-
ation with competitors can lead to value creation, access to resources, cost-sharing, and 
market entry speed. On the other hand, the interaction with rivals can also cause chal-
lenges and risks such as dependence, loss of control, trust-building issues, and oppor-
tunism. 
 
Even though the theories used to explain the reason why firms form coopetition rela-
tionships, there have been mixed results whether the formation has a positive or nega-
tive impact on performance. Ritala (2012, p. 308), for example, states that the success 
of coopetition depends on the industry. And that most advantageous for market perfor-
mance is a rather low competition intensity (Ritala, 2012). Another study found that an 
increase in performance can be achieved when firms minimize cooperating with only 
some of their key competitors (Ritala et al., 2008). Moreover, researchers discovered 
that a central position within a network could lead to increased market performance 
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(Sanou et al., 2016). While there is already information about coopetition's performance 
outcome, results are mixed and remains an area with potential research. 
 
In this thesis, the industry centralized is the airline industry that underwent notable 
changes during the 1990s and turned from a government-owned to a privatized industry. 
The development forced airlines to develop a competitive strategy to guarantee their 
survival. Low-cost carriers increased competition in the industry during the last years, 
and so has interactions with rival firms become a common strategy. A form of horizontal 
coopetition is the formation of strategic airline alliances. While potential benefits and 
challenges have been researched, the impact on member airlines' performance is under-
researched. 
 
Therefore, this research aims to understand the impact of coopetition on airlines' market 
performance. The proposed model in Figure 7 represents the research path and the 
measurements used to analyze the airlines and find the answer to the research question. 
The measurements are taken from different sources, aviation and non-aviation studies. 
The primary source is a study by Ritala (2012), where he analyzed innovation and market 
performance through the coopetition strategy of Finnish firms (Figure 5). Moreover, avi-



















Figure 7. Theoretical Framework 
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4.1. Research philosophy and methodological approach 
The research philosophy is the first layer of the onion (see Figure 8) and provides the 
base for the research strategy and chosen methods. There are four main research phi-
losophies identified, which are positivism, pragmatism, realism, and interpretivism. Each 
of these philosophies is grounded on different assumptions of the source, nature, and 
development of knowledge. Moreover, each philosophy can follow the view of ontology 
or epistemology, which are two different ways of thinking. (Saunders et al., 2009, pp. 
108-109). 
 
Ontology can be defined as being “concerned with the nature of reality” (Saunders et 
al., 2009, p. 110). More specifically, it reflects the view of the researcher about facts and 
how the world operates. The researcher’s ontological position can be either objective or 
subjective. In this thesis, the ontological position is a subjective view. Subjectivism refers 
to the interdependence between the existence of business entities and social actions, 
while objectivism rejects its interdependence. According to the subjective continua, mul-
tiple realities exist, which is also true for this research (Saunders et al., 2009). Contrary, 
epistemology deals with the researcher’s view on what knowledge constitutes as ac-
ceptable. It is concerned with the study of knowledge. It incorporates all elements es-
sential to acquire knowledge, “ranging from numerical data to textual and visual data, 
from facts to interpretations, and including narratives, stories and even fictional ac-
counts” (Saunders et al., 2009, p. 127). 
 
This thesis has a research philosophy that is positivist in nature. Remenyi et al. (1998, p. 
32) describe positivism as “working with an observable social reality and that the end 
product of such research can be law-like generalizations similar to those produced by the 
physical and natural scientists”. Moreover, research that is positivist in nature is based 
on facts rather than impressions. Therefore, it is highlighted that a quantitative data col-
lection technique is suitable to offer value-free results. However, Saunders et al. (2009) 
point out that in-depth interviews can also be applied to collect data when following a 
positivism research philosophy. 
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When deciding on the approach to theory development, there are three main logics to 
choose from: deduction, abduction, and induction (Maylor & Blackmon, 2005, pp. 150-
152). An inductive approach has the logic to create a theory based on the collected data. 
The data is mainly from qualitative collection techniques used to develop a conceptual 
framework. Another characteristic of this approach is the structure from the specific to 
the general (Saunders et al., 2009, p. 127). The abductive approach is a combination of 
characteristics from the inductive approach and the deductive approach and increasingly 
used for scientific research. Thus, it is a constant movement of existing theoretical liter-
ature and empirical data (Dubois & Gadde, 2002). Dubois and Gadde (2002, p. 559) de-
scribe the approach as “fruitful if the researcher’s objective is to discover new things — 
other variables and other relationships”. 
 
This thesis follows a deductive research approach, a top-down approach where the 
structure of the research paper is from the general to the specific. In the deductive ap-
proach, “a clear theoretical position is developed prior to the collection of data” 
(Saunders et al., 2009, p. 41). The theoretical framework is created based on the existing 
literature. After data is collected, it is used to evaluate the hypothesis based on existing 
theory (Saunders et al., 2009). According to the deductive approach, this thesis presents 
a detailed review of existing literature about the topic of coopetition and the airline in-
dustry. After the development of the theoretical framework, data will be collected and 
analyzed. The research combines and extends earlier studies to examine the impact of 
coopetition in strategic alliances on airlines' market performance. 
 
 
4.2. Research Design 
A research design is a “logical and systematic plan” about the preparation and direction 
of the research study that aims to answer the research question at the end 
(Krishnaswami & Satyaprasad, 2010, p. 41). Moreover, the research design acts like a 
plan or blueprint that provides information about the collection, analysis, and 
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interpretation of data. According to Krishnaswami and Satyaprasad (2010, p. 42), the 
research design is a complex concept and different perspectives need to be taken into 
consideration. According to Saunders et al. (2009, p. 136), the research design consists 
of the next three layers of the onion (Figure 8) which refers to the research choice, re-
search strategy, and time horizons. 
 
Saunders et al. (2009, p. 151) distinguish between two data collection techniques: qual-
itative and quantitative. A qualitative research choice is a synonym for interviews and 
data analysis processes that leads to non-numerical data. Contrary, a quantitative data 
collection technique is, for example, questionnaires, graphs, or statistics that use numer-
ical data. (Saunders et al., 2009, p. 151). This thesis follows a qualitative research method. 
Qualitative research is particularly useful when aiming to gain insight into one’s experi-
ence, background information, and standpoint (Hammarberg, Kirkman, & De Lacey, 
2016). Moreover, existing studies on coopetition concerning performance and the result 
of the literature review indicate that interpretations mainly rely on quantitative data col-
lection techniques (Ritala et al., 2008; Park & Cho, 1997). Therefore, in this thesis, semi-
structured interviews with three different airlines are conducted. These three airlines 
are Lufthansa, Finnair, and Alitalia, and each belongs to a separate strategic alliance. 
 
Moving further with the layers of the onion, the research strategy will be discussed next. 
According to Saunders et al. (2009, p. 141), different research strategies are often linked 
to a particular research approach. However, the main aim is to choose the research strat-
egy that helps meet objectives and answers the research question. Possible strategies 
can be, for example, experiments, surveys, case studies, archival research, or action re-
search. This thesis utilizes case studies as a research strategy. Case studies are especially 
useful when the aim is to answer research questions that focus on the ‘what?’ and ‘how?’ 
(Saunders et al., 2009, p. 146). In general, case study research can either be with a single 
case study or multiple case studies, as well as involve analysis of various levels (Yin, Case 
study research : design and methods, 2003). 
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Since I study the impact on three airlines’ market performance in three different strate-
gic alliances, this thesis relies on multiple case studies. The advantage of multiple case 
studies is that “cases which confirm the propositions enhance confidence in the validity 
of the concepts and their relationships; cases which disconfirm the relationships can 
provide an opportunity to refine the theory” (Hyde, 2000, p. 85). When using case stud-
ies as a research strategy, it is necessary to use the triangulation of data. According to 
Saunders et al. (2009, p. 146), triangulation “refers to the use of different data collection 
techniques within one study in order to ensure that the data are telling you what you 
think they are telling you”. Yin (2003, p. 39) distinguishes between a single case study 
and multiple case studies, where the second one can be referred to as triangulation. 
 
To study the impact of coopetitive strategic alliances on airlines’ market performance in 
a proper context, the study considers different criteria. First, each airline chosen as a 
case company needs to be a member of a different strategic alliance. By studying the 
airlines Lufthansa, Finnair, and Alitalia, I will not only focus on three different airlines 
from three different countries within Europe but also cover three major strategic alli-
ances: Star Alliance, oneworld, and SkyTeam. Second, each airline is of different size, 
which can lead to additional information about the impact of alliances. The confidence 
in the results to be interpreted is improved due to the fact that the research includes 
multiple case studies (Hyde, 2000, p. 85). Furthermore, each airline needs to have 
enough information available about the data to be analyzed. 
 
All in all, the purpose of my research is of exploratory nature due to the aim of scoping 
“out the magnitude or extent of a particular phenomenon, problem, or behavior” 
(Bhattacherjee, 2012, p. 5). Saunders et al. (2009, p. 140) mention three ways to conduct 
exploratory research: reviewing existing literature, interviewing experts, or interviewing 
a focus group. Moreover, case studies are often used in exploratory research and com-
bined with a data collection technique such as interviews. 
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The final decision to make regarding the research design is the time horizon. Research 
can be either a cross-sectional study or longitudinal study. According to Saunders et al. 
(2009, p. 155), cross-sectional studies can be described as a “Snapshot” of time, while 
longitudinal studies focus on change measured over-time. This thesis follows a cross-
sectional time horizon, even though a longitudinal approach would allow more detailed 
information. However, the main reason being for this choice is time limitations. 
 
 
4.3. Data collection and analysis 
Aforementioned, I briefly described the data collection technique utilized in this thesis, 
which will be discussed more extensively in this chapter. This thesis applies semi-struc-
tured interviews as a form to collect data. Unstructured and semi-structured interviews 
are commonly used when following research that is of exploratory nature (Saunders et 
al., 2009, p. 323). To compare the results of the different interviews more closely and 
guarantee consistency, semi-structured interviews are preferred. This way, it can be en-
sured that all relevant matters are covered and discussed during the interview. 
 
The semi-structured interviews lasted approximately 30 to 60 minutes and were fully 
transcribed, resulting in 38 pages of transcript. The interview participants were selected 
based on the belonging to the airlines and their position in the company. The interview-
ees have been in the company for multiple years, ensuring in-depth knowledge about 
the development throughout the last five to seven years. Moreover, the participants 
have a position in the department of alliance and partnership management, resulting in 
qualitative answers and in-depth knowledge about the airline’s cooperation and perfor-
mance. Alitalia’s interviewee is not employed by Alitalia anymore but is now a partner 
at a large consulting firm, Bain & Company, responsible for Airlines and Transportation. 
As a former employee for Alitalia, he was the vice president of strategy and business 
development. Therefore, he was the ideal candidate for the interview, even though not 
employed at Alitalia anymore. 
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The case companies were selected using the purposive sampling technique based on 
the researcher’s judgment. According to Saunders et al. (2009, p. 237), this method is 
often applied when dealing with a small sample size. Moreover, choosing the cases by 
oneself allows to critically evaluate which companies best serve to answer the research 
question. The cases are homogenous in some way, such as industry and company pur-
pose. At the same time, they are also somewhat heterogeneous, and the companies vary 
significantly in size, geographical location, and financial situation. Those similarities and 
differences create strength and allow “to document uniqueness” (Saunders et al., 2009, 
p. 239).  
 
The semi-structured interviews are conducted with three different companies from the 
airline industry. That ensures the collection of different points of view, experience, and 
outlook for the future. The data collection technique is a multi-method qualitative case 
study. That is, because, in addition to the collection of primary data, secondary data was 
also obtained through the use of annual reports of the different companies, articles, and 
the company’s website. The annual reports contain information about the company, its 
vision, strategy, and financial indicators. Finnair and Lufthansa’s reports had a similar 
structure and completeness, whereas Alitalia lacked annual reports of the last seven 
years. The material collected is useful and can be compared with primary data from the 
interviews. The primary data is also used to find answers to questions that could not be 
solved by inspecting annual reports. Moreover, secondary data was used in the interview 
guide-making-process and beneficial to prepare for the interviews with the experts. The 
study’s trustworthiness can thus be ensured through the triangulation of data (Saunders 
et al., 2009, p. 154). 
 
This thesis is empirically supported by primary qualitative data gathered through semi-
structured interviews with experts from the airline industry, specifically with experts 
from Lufthansa German Airlines, Finnair, and Alitalia (Table 7). Semi-structured inter-
views allow the interviewee to express oneself more freely due to the open-ended ques-
tions. Thus, the obtained data is more significant and contains extended, in-depth 
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explanations (Saunders et al., 2009, p. 324). To conclude, primary data is collected 
through semi-structured interviews. While, secondary data, such as revenue, EBIT, num-
ber of aircrafts, is collected to get a first impression of the airline’s development over the 
last seven years and to prepare the interview guide accurately. 
 
Table 7. Respondent profiles 







Lufthansa Konstantin von Wedelstädt 
Manager Business Devel-
opment Network & Part-
nership Management 
Telephone 01.07.2020 00:49:19 German 
Finnair Iida Ketola 
Manager, Airline Partner-
ships & Alliances 





Partner at Bain: Airlines 
and Transportation; former 
vice president of strategy 
and business development 
at Alitalia 
Zoom 21.07.2020 01:11:48 English 
 
The interview guide was structured as followed. I began by introducing myself, the topic 
of my thesis, and the purpose of the interview. Then, I asked questions about the inter-
viewee to collect information about its position in the company and responsibilities. Fol-
lowing, the questions focused on the airline's performance, including its market situa-
tion within Europe and international, how the competition affected the airline, and the 
market uncertainty. The extraordinary circumstances arising from the outbreak of the 
COVID-19 virus were also a focus area, including its effect on the whole airline industry, 
and the airline itself. The next part of the interview centralized the strategic alliances. I 
aimed to collect information about the benefits and challenges that the airline experi-
ences from the strategic alliance, its position in the strategic alliance, and whether it is a 
win-win situation for all airlines within an alliance or rather a win-lose situation. The 
closing questions concentrated on the alliance's development and future and whether it 
has positively impacted the airline. 
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The interview with Lufthansa’s employee was conducted in his native language, German, 
which avoided misunderstandings due to the language barrier. The other two interviews 
were carried out in English due to my Finnish and Italian skills’ lack of proficiency. Nev-
ertheless, it was the interviewee’s and informant’s second language; I could not notice 
any problems concerning the understanding and interpreting the conversation. 
 
After transcribing the interviews, it is essential to analyze the data to make it useful and 
make sure that the answers’ meaning is understood. Saunders et al. (2009, p. 490) high-
light three different types of processes to analyze qualitative data: summarizing, catego-
rizing, and structuring of meanings. I examined the interviews following a categorizing 
data technique. Categorizing data includes two processes, first, different categories 
need to be created, and second, the data from the interviews need to be connected to 
the developed categories (Saunders et al., 2009, p. 492). Additionally, I used the program 
MAXQDA to professionalize the analysis and, at the same time, make it more simple to 
review the categories and meaningful chunk of data. As Sanders et al. (2009, p. 492) 
describe, the labels are created based on the theoretical framework, the interview ques-
tions, and the data retrieved. Moreover, I used the same codes for the different inter-
views, which allowed me to make more districted comparisons. The program created a 
data card where the coded words, sentences, and paragraphs were summarized. That 
“has the effect of reducing and rearranging your data into a more manageable and com-
prehensible form” (Saunders et al., 2009, p. 493). Eisenhardt (1989) suggests that a 
successful tactic to search for cross-case patterns is creating categories and compare 
those across the cases in order to find similarities and differences. The data card helped 
me have the crucial data for the analysis available. 
 
As an analytical technique, I chose to conduct a single-case analysis first. That allowed 
me to focus on each airline individually, as well as present and analyze the data collected. 
After the single-case analysis, a table that summarizes the findings from the analysis 
were used as a base for the cross-case analysis. According to Yin (2009), a cross-case 
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analysis is useful when dealing with more than one case study. It has the purpose of 
comparing the findings to come to a relevant conclusion—allowing me to write the single 
case analysis and cross-case analysis more focused. Additionally, with all relevant data in 




4.4. Trustworthiness of the study 
The standard measurements to characterize the quality of a research project are validity 
and reliability. However, qualitative researchers often question the compatibility of 
these two qualitative research criteria, who favor using different measures to distinguish 
from quantitative ones (Shenton, 2004). Lincoln and Guba (1985) present four criteria 
that can be applied to ensure trustworthiness in a qualitative study. Also, Shenton (2004) 
selects those criteria to describe how to assure preciseness in qualitative research. 
Therefore, in this thesis, I apply the following principles to examine the trustworthiness 
of this study: credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability. 
 
According to Lincoln and Guba (1985), the first criterion is credibility, and one of the 
most important ones to ensure trustworthiness. It is concerned with the consistency of 
the research findings and reality. More specifically, it demonstrates the confidence that 
can be put in the truth-value of the research findings. The adoption of a well-established 
research method can enhance credibility. Therefore, different strategies, such as pro-
longed engagement, persistent observation, triangulation, or member check, can be uti-
lized to ensure trustworthiness. To guarantee credibility in this thesis, I spend sufficient 
time summarizing the case companies' information and analyzing their data. This data 
was collected through annual reports, the company's website, as well as articles. The 
interpretation of the data is the base for the expert interviews with the case companies. 
Thus, this thesis contains triangulation as a research method and enhances credibility. 
Furthermore, this thesis's empirical analysis section includes multiple direct citations 
from interviews that evidences the “truth value” of the research. 
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The second criterion to be acknowledged is transferability and refers to the degree to 
which the study results can be applied and related to other contexts or settings (Shenton, 
2004). This thesis relies on interviews as the primary research method and is conducted 
with interviewees from three different companies operating in the same industry. The 
interview questions are a mix of more general matters related to the industry and com-
pany-specific issues. Therefore, the possibility to draw generalized conclusions for the 
phenomenon is somewhat limited to the analyzed industry. However, “if practitioners 
believe their situations to be similar to that described in the study, they may relate the 
findings to their own positions” (Shenton, 2004, p. 69). Moreover, it needs to be noted 
that the airlines chosen for the case company are of different sizes. Therefore, the re-
sults can be applied not only for one type of airline but for a wide range of airlines, 
including small, medium, and large airlines. Nevertheless, each airline needs to evaluate 
their company’s fit to the case companies’ characteristics. 
 
The third criterion to evaluate the trustworthiness of this thesis is dependability. De-
pendability is an essential element in qualitative research and refers to the study as re-
peatable and consistent. It characterizes a study where results would be the same if it 
were conducted again with the identical participants, in the same setting and the same 
research methods. According to Shenton (2004, p. 71), “in order to address the depend-
ability issue more directly, the processes within the study should be reported in detail, 
thereby enabling a future researcher to repeat the work, if not necessarily to gain the 
same results”. I evaluated the airlines' data from the years 2013 to 2019, and this can be 
done again because those data will not change. Also, it is possible to repeat the inter-
views with the selected participants. However, to achieve results for the same research 
topic in the future, the latest data should be chosen. During the interviews, one central 
issue was the current COVID epidemic that significantly impacted the airline industry. 
Conducting the study again in the future, the external factors influencing the industry 
might be different. Thus, even though the interviewees, setting, and methods are the 
same, the results might differ. 
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The fourth and last evaluation criterion that needs to be established to ensure trustwor-
thiness is confirmability. Confirmability deals with the reliance that results are based on 
the interviewee's narratives rather than the researcher's bias. The researcher needs to 
ensure that the findings are shaped by the participants rather one's own opinion 
(Shenton, 2004). To ensure confirmability in my thesis, I use interviewees' names and 
include their statements in citations in my analysis and evaluation. The interviewing of 
one employee per company also improves the confirmability in the sense that the results 
are no figments but retrieved from data. Moreover, I re-veal the case companies' names 
and present essential information and data, which increases confirmability. Also, it needs 
to be acknowledged that I was not employed at any company during the research, which 
allows a more objective and holistic overview. 
 
After discussing the four criteria that ensure the research study's trustworthiness, it is 
essential to draw attention to the research design's ethical issues. Saunders et al. (2009, 
p. 160) emphasize that the research data is collected with ethical consideration and thus, 
morally defendable. For this study, the interviewees' approval for their voluntary partic-
ipation was asked; the permission for recording was requested. Participants were in-
formed that a with-drawing from the interview questions is possible at any time. Those 
elements integrated into my thesis are examples of ethical practice in this study. 
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5. Empirical Analysis and Results 
In this chapter, the companies Lufthansa, Finnair, and Alitalia will be presented in the 
form of a case study. The first section introduces each airline that was selected for this 
master’s thesis. Moreover, data from each airline is collected, presented, and analyzed 
from the years 2013-2019. The data allows a first attempt in evaluating how well each 
airline is performing. In the second section, a single-case analysis will first be applied. A 
cross-case analysis will then be used to highlight the common characteristics, diversities, 
and outcomes regarding the performance of airlines through the coopetition in the form 
of strategic alliances. 
 
 
5.1. Case Companies 
Following, an introduction of the three case companies Lufthansa German Airlines, Fin-
nair, and Alitalia. The company description also contains a brief overview of the key fig-
ures between 2013 and 2019. 
 
5.1.1. Lufthansa German Airlines 
Deutsche Lufthansa AG, commonly known as Lufthansa or Lufthansa German airlines, is 
the largest German aviation company that offers scheduled passenger transportation 
services. The full-service airline was established in 1953 and has been the German na-
tional carrier with its headquarters in Cologne, Germany. In 1997, the company was pri-
vatized to “increase the group’s competitiveness, and contributed to Lufthansa’s long-
term strategy of developing into the world-wide leading provider of air travel and air 
travel contiguous services” (Lufthansa Group, 2020a). In the same year, Lufthansa, Air 
Canada, SAS, Thai Airways International, and United Airlines formed the first global alli-
ance “Star Alliance” in Frankfurt, Germany. Since 2014, Carsten Spohr is the chairman of 
the executive board and CEO. 
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Lufthansa operates from two major hubs located in Munich, and Frankfurt am Main, 
Germany. Moreover, the airline has evolved into an aviation group that consists of net-
work airlines (Austrian Airlines, SWISS, and Brussels), Eurowings, and aviation services. 
The segment of aviation services includes logistics, MRO (maintenance, repair and over-
haul), IT services, flight training, and additional businesses and group functions 
(Lufthansa Group, 2020a). In 2017, Lufthansa received the reward as a five-star airline, 
making Lufthansa the first airline within Europe to receive the award while the other 
nine airlines are based in Asia. Besides being a founding airline of the strategic alliance, 
Lufthansa formed three joint ventures which allow a broad coverage of destinations. The 
transatlantic joint venture (A++) consists of United Airlines and Air Canada, the Europe-
Japan joint venture is formed with All Nippon Airways (ANA), and the third joint venture 
is with Singapore Airlines (Lufthansa Group, 2019). 
 
The corona pandemic has hit the airline industry heavily. Almost all airlines had to keep 
their fleet on the ground, influencing the turnover and financial stability. The crisis forced 
Lufthansa to accept a stabilization package offered by the economic stabilization fund of 
the federal republic of Germany. The deal includes a €9bn loan with the condition that 
the German government has a 20% stake, thus decreasing the airline's decision-making 
power. Moreover, the airline needs to give up slots to competitors at the Munich airport, 
and Frankfurt am Main airport (Lufthansa Group, 2020b). 
 
The following key figures of the carrier present the financial results as well as traffic data 
from the years 2013 till 2019. It is the largest airline in Germany, and Lufthansa CityLine 
and Air Dolomiti regional airlines are part of Lufthansa German airlines. Therefore, the 
key figures are including regional partners. 
 
Table 8. Key figures: Lufthansa German Airlines 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Turnover and Result 
Revenue €m 17,302 17,098 17,944 15,409 16,441 15,917 16,119 
Adjusted EBITDA €m 1,409 1,238 1,845 2,700 3,082 2,750 2,336 
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Adjusted EBIT €m 265 399 970 1,135 1,627 1,753 1,225 
EBIT €m n.d. 393 904 1,723 2,067 1,773 1,167 
Traffic Data 
Passengers (thousands) 76,261 77,547 79,305 62,418 70,108 70,108 71,307 
Employees 39,847 40,199 40,262 34,654 34,754 34,754 35,221 
Aircrafts 396 400 414 350 357 351 364 
Route Network 218 235 258 203 205 209 214 
RPK (million) 153,334 156,826 162,173 145,878 152,750 160,074 168,085 
ASK (million) 193,807 197,478 202,314 184,428 187,762 196,769 204,202 
 
In 2013, Lufthansa generated 17.3bn Euros in revenue, and the adjusted EBIT came to 
EUR 265m (Figure 9). The year 2014 represents a downturn in revenues, which ac-
counted for 17bn Euros and an adjusted EBIT of EUR 399m. The peak for Lufthansa was 
2015, with revenues of 17.9bn Euros and a passenger number of almost 80 million (Fig-
ure 10). While the revenue and passengers declined significantly during 2016, the ad-
justed EBIT rose to 1.1bn Euros. The years 2017 and 2018 represent a high adjusted EBIT 
of EUR 1.6bn and EUR1.7bn. However, it indicates a decline in revenue from 16.4bn Eu-
ros to 15.9bn Euros. In 2019, the airline had to experience a decrease in adjusted EBIT 
of 30% to 1.2bn Euros, while the revenue increased slightly. 
 
 
Figure 9. Lufthansa: Development of Revenue and Adjusted EBIT 
 
Based on Figure 10, the passenger number increased during the years 2013 and 2015 to 
nearly 80 million. In the year 2016, the number of passengers dropped to 62 million. The 
decline can be linked to the reduction in Lufthansa’s numbers of aircraft from 414 to 350 
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onwards, the number of passengers increased again to around 70 million. Also, the num-
ber of aircraft as well as the route network, have been raised again, however only slightly. 
According to Figure 11, in 2019, Lufthansa German airlines had a fleet of 364 and cov-
ered 214 destinations. 
 
 
Figure 10. Lufthansa: Passengers in Million 
 
 
Figure 11. Lufthansa: Aircrafts and Route Network 
 
The available seat kilometers (ASK) and revenue passenger kilometers (RPK) have a sim-
ilar development over the years as the number of aircraft due to their relation to each 
other (Figure 12). The ASK can be used as a measurement for the passenger carrying 
capacity. It can be defined as the available seats for sale multiplied with the number of 
kilometers flown in 2013 was 193bn. The RPK indicates the number of kilometers that 
are flown by a paying passenger and was 153bn in 2013. That leads to a passenger load 
factor of 79%. In 2014 and 2015, the number of aircraft increased; so did the ASK and 
RPK with a passenger load factor of 79% and 80%. In 2016, the ASK decreased due to the 
fleet's reduction, which also limited the RPK, and the passenger load factor declined to 
79%. Based on Figure 12, from 2017 onwards, the ASK increased again from 187bn to 
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passenger load factor was 82% in 2017, followed by a decrease of 1% in 2018, and in-
creased to 82% again in 2019. 
 
 
Figure 12. Lufthansa: Available seat kilometers (ASK) and revenue passenger kilometers 
(RPK) 
 
All in all, based on the previous figures, data shows that Lufthansa changed between 
2015 and 2016. The restructuring is demonstrated in a reduction of its business in terms 
of fleet and network. Also, the number of employees went down from 40.262 to 34.654. 
However, the adjusted EBIT increased again after the restructuring. 
 
5.1.2. Finnair 
Finnair Oyj, commonly known as Finnair, provides airline services, including passenger 
transportation, charter services, and cargo services domestically and internationally. The 
network carrier was established in 1923, then known as Aero, and is headquartered in 
Helsinki, Finland. The long history makes it one of the oldest operating airlines in the 
world. In 1992, the airline introduced its frequent flyer program “Finnair Plus” which is 
still active today. The year 1997 marks the airline’s entrance in the strategic alliance one-
world and joins as the first non-founding airline. In 2011, the airlines developed a cost-
saving program to build a good base for future development. The 200 million saving and 
restructuring program was completed in 2014, and one year later, the airline turned into 
profit again (Finnair, n.d.). The major shareholder of Finnair is the government, with a 
share of 67,86% in 2020. And since 2019, the president and chief executive officer of the 
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Finnair offers destinations domestically, within Europe, to North America, but is espe-
cially focused on transportation to Asian countries. In 2019, the airline provided 21 des-
tinations in Asia. Passengers can enjoy non-stop routes between Europe and Asia, such 
as Nanjing, Hongkong, and different cities in Japan. Besides being a member of oneworld, 
Finnair formed joint ventures which allow a broad coverage of destinations. The airline 
participates in the Siberia joint business and an Atlantic joint business joint venture. 
(Finnair, 2019). Moreover, the airline is continuously listed as one of the safest airlines in 
the world. According to Finnair (2020), the partnerships “strengthen Finnair’s market 
position and reduce the risks related to growth” as well as “have a significant contribu-
tion to Finnair’s revenue”. 
 
Table 9. Key figures: Finnair 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Turnover and Result 
Revenue €m 2,400.3 2,284.5 2,324.0 2,316.8 2,568.4 2,836.6 3,097.7 
Adjusted EBITDA €m 210.1 176.6 231.2 270.4 436.2 512.6 488.3 
Adjusted EBIT €m 11.9 -36.5 23.7 55.2 170.4 218.4 162.8 
EBIT €m 7.9 -72.5 121.7 116.2 224.8 256.30 160.0 
Net Result €m 22.9 -82.5 89.70 85.10 169.40 101.60 74.50 
Traffic Data 
Passengers (thousands) 9,270 9,630 10,294 10,087 11,905 13,281 14,650 
Employees 5,803 4,981 4,817 4,937 5,918 6,462 6,788 
Aircrafts 70 67 72 73 79 81 83 
Route Network 74 75 78 90 126 130 136 
RPK (million) 24,776 24,772 25,592 27,065 30,750 34,660 38,534 
ASK (million) 31,162 30,899 31,836 33,914 36,922 42,385 47,188 
 
Between 2013 and 2016, the revenue was around 2.3bn Euros (Figure 13). In 2013, Fin-
nair achieved an adjusted EBIT of EUR 12m but faced a downturn in 2014 with an ad-
justed EBIT of -37m Euros and a net result of -82.5m Euros. Based on Figure 13, from 
2015 to 2018, Finnair improved the adjusted EBIT from 24m Euros in 2015 to 218m Euros 
in 2018. Since 2017, the revenue had increased significantly from 2.6bn to 3bn in 2019. 
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However, in 2019, the adjusted EBIT declined to 163m Euros, and the net result dropped 
from 101m Euros in 2018 to 74.5m Euros in 2019. 
 
 
Figure 13. Finnair: Development of Revenue and Adjusted EBIT 
 
The passenger numbers' development is equal to the revenue, which means that during 
2013 and 2016, the number of passengers was around 9.8 million (Figure 14). That can 
be linked to the number of aircraft which did not change significantly during the period 
but remained about 71 aircraft (Figure 15). In 2016 the airline started to expand its route 
network from 78 to 90 destinations. According to Figure 15, the most significant increase 
in geographical coverage happened in 2017 when the route network expanded to 126 
destinations and increased until 2019 to 136. The number of aircraft increased more 
substantially from 2017, where the airline had a fleet of 79 and in 2019, grew to 83 
planes. The increase in fleet and route network also caused the number of passengers 
to rise significantly from 2017. Based on Figure 14, the airline had 11.9 million passen-
gers in 2017, which reached in 2019 14.6 million. 
 
 
Figure 14. Finnair: Passengers in Million 
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Figure 15. Finnair: Aircrafts and Route Network 
 
The available seat kilometers (ASK) and revenue passenger kilometers (RPK) have the 
same development over the years as the number of aircraft due to their relation to each 
other (Figure 16). During the years 2013 and 2015, the passenger-carrying capacity and 
the RPK increased only slightly. In 2013, the ASK was 31.1bn and 31.8bn in 2015. Based 
on Figure 16, the RPK increased from 24.7bn to 35.5bn during the time. Also, the pas-
senger load factor was constant from 2013 to 2015 and accounted for 80%. From 2016 
onwards, the ASK and RPK had a more substantial increase. The ASK developed from 
33.9bn in 2016 to 47.1bn in 2019. The kilometers that were flown by a paying passenger 
and were 27bn in 2016 and 38.5bn in 2019. During the period, the passenger load factor 
was 83% in 2017, 82% in 2018, and decreased to 81% in 2017. 
 
 
Figure 16. Finnair: Available seat kilometers (ASK) and revenue passenger kilometers 
(RPK) 
 
Finnair developed, especially between 2016 to 2019, where its route network and fleet 
increased, resulting in more ASK and higher passenger numbers. Revenue and adjusted 
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EBIT increased compared to the period between 2013 and 2015. Also, the number of 
employees declined from 5.803 in 2013 to 4.817 in 2015 but has been growing since 
2016 from 4.937 to 6.788 in 2019. 
 
5.1.3. Alitalia 
Alitalia Societa Aerea Italiana S.p.A., commonly known as Alitalia, is the Italian national 
carrier and offers passenger and cargo services across different destinations. The head-
quarter is located in Rome, where the airline has one of its main hubs. Moreover, the 
airline joined the SkyTeam alliance in 2001. Since the beginning of operating in 1947, 
Alitalia has had to face multiple crises (Di Marco, 2018). Until 1996 the airline enjoyed a 
monopolistic situation in the Italian market but started to face financial problems from 
1997 due to the lack of a business plan—the airline received different funds to overcome 
their financial obstacles. Also, the increasing competition due to the European rules on 
the liberalization of the airline market put pressure on Alitalia. It forced airlines to de-
velop a competitive strategy to guarantee their survival. In 2006, most of the routes in 
Italy were flown by foreign carriers, such as Ryanair. 
 
End of 2006, the government wanted to sell its remaining shares from Alitalia. However, 
it “was not an attractive buy: its fleet was obsolete and diverse, its productivity low, its 
brand name nearly worthless and its finances far from sound” (Beria, Niemeier, & 
Fröhlich, 2011, p. 216). The only strengths of the airline were its slots and political pro-
tection. In 2007, the airline became private again and received another loan of €300 
million. In 2008, investors formed the Compagnia Aerea Italiana (CAI) and bought, after 
permission by the government, Alitalia, and another bankrupted Italian airline AirOne. 
The new Alitalia started its operation in 2009. In the same year, the owners of CAI sold 
25% of shares to Air France-KLM (Beria et al., 2011). 
 
In 2015, Etihad Airways bought 49% of the stake, and the operations and names were 
changed to Alitalia-SAI. Two years later, the joint venture between Alitalia and Air France-
KLM was canceled. Then in 2017, the airline filed for bankruptcy. After several 
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discussions and offers by different airlines, the government announced in April 2020, 
that they would take over Alitalia since it would not otherwise survive the corona pan-
demic. The new CEO of Alitalia is a former Emirates manager. According to an article 
from Forbes, “Alitalia has received financing worth €12 billion ($13.4 billion) since its 
foundation in 1974” (Dominioni, 2020). Since the airline has not published any annual 
reports from the last years, no key figures of Alitalia's performance are presented. 
 
 
5.2. Single Case Analysis 
To answer the research question and its objectives, there is the need to evaluate the 
interviewed companies' findings to analyze the impact of strategic alliances on the per-
formance of the three airlines used as cases for this research. To do so, a single case 
study is conducted before comparing the companies' findings in a cross-case analysis. 
The single-case analysis follows a similar structure to the conducted interviews. 
 
5.2.1. Lufthansa in the Star Alliance 
Development of the Airline industry and the performance of Lufthansa 
The interviewee, manager of business development network and partnership manage-
ment of Lufthansa, has extensive knowledge about the industry as well as the company. 
He explains the development of the airline industry and the performance of Lufthansa 
during the last years. According to him, the air transportation has been doing well over 
the last ten years, internationally as well as within Europe. The interviewee describes the 
development of different competitor groups. The low cost carriers, especially Ryanair 
and EasyJet, have grown in size and started to operate from hub airports to compete 
with full-service carriers. However, the respondent highlights that Lufthansa could afford 
to act aggressively against the threat at their hub in Frankfurt am Main. 
 
“Even the entry of Ryanair in Frankfurt has of course already frightened us. But we 
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have managed to slow down their further growth a little with suitable measures 
such as network control and pricing, at least on the operational side. I believe that 
the plans that Ryanair originally had here in Frankfurt could not be realized.” 
 
The low-cost carriers not only started to move to hub airports but have also added long 
haul routes to their strategy. The interviewee points out Norwegian as an example, trying 
to compete on the long haul but failed. Therefore, low-cost carriers on the long haul do 
not account for a threat to Lufthansa. Moreover, the golf carriers such as Etihad, Emirates, 
and Qatar, a danger for Lufthansa, have not grown significantly over the last few years, 
which is a sign that they reached their limits. According to the interviewee, Turkish Air-
lines, an alliance partner and strong competitor for Lufthansa, is continue to grow after 
a crisis in Turkey. All in all, the number of airlines did not change significantly, though 
competition has been intense. As stated by the respondent, the next development would 
have been an airline consolidation. However, this did not take place in Europe yet but 
would have happened in the next years, if the COVID pandemic did not occur. 
 
“Many smaller flag carriers would actually either join one of the larger groups or 
disappear from the market in the end. In the current situation, each country will of 
course support its own airline for now. But because state aid is now being used 
everywhere, airlines will not consolidate for some time in the future.” 
 
Despite the high competition, Lufthansa was able to grow continuously. Especially 2017, 
2018, and 2019 have been the best years for the airline, which the interviewee confirms 
and which is also visible in the data collected from the annual reports (Table 8). The 
interviewee highlights that Lufthansa with its two hubs in Germany, in Frankfurt am Main 
and Munich, is on a good performance level and describes its market position as number 
two in Europe, after IAG and before KLM-Air France. 
 
“Despite all the competitive issues, where ten years ago one would have said golf 
career threat, low-cost carriers in Europe, we were able to improve our results con-
tinuously. And the last three years were the best for Lufthansa.” 
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After all, Lufthansa is a five-star airline; however, as per the interviewee, it's an airline 
that is not the first mover to adopt changes but observes the situation first before acting. 
It is pointed out that in a dynamic and continuously changing industry, it is crucial to 
keep up with the competition; otherwise, the airline will be behind quickly. One example 
is the implementation of the premium economy, which has developed to Lufthansa's 
most profitable seating class. That is because passengers are willing to pay more for 
more comfort; versus business travelers, who are no longer allowed to fly business class 
because of a tight company budget. This indicates changes in customer needs and a new 
trend in the airline industry. 
 
“We like to observe a situation like this, then we think about it five times before it 
is implemented. But meanwhile we have Premium Economy almost everywhere. In 
many markets it has become very successful and perhaps a trend.” 
 
Moreover, the interviewee was asked about the influences and changes for Lufthansa 
and the airline industry due to the Covid-19 epidemic. The interviewee claimed that: 
 
“The demand will change, it will be lower, at least for the next three years. Also, 
the demand structure will change, less corporate travel will take place compared 
to leisure travel. The uncertainty leads to faster, and more short-term market 
changes and a more aggressive competitive behavior.” 
 
Strategic Alliances and its performance 
The interviewee was questioned about the benefits that Lufthansa receives through the 
Star Alliance. He mentions several advantages that can be divided into customer and 
airline benefits. Starting with the benefits for customers, Star Alliance allows customers 
to collect miles and have lounge access with partner airlines. Moreover, it creates a qual-
ity promise to the customer where all airlines, who are members of the alliance, have 
similar standards and quality levels around the world. Additionally, the alliance grants 
the customer to travel with multiple airlines seamlessly. The interviewee also mentions 
various benefits for Lufthansa being a member of Star Alliance. Now it is relatively 
 88 
inexpensive. Furthermore, airlines can do their marketing together, even though the re-
spondent points out that Lufthansa is already a strong brand itself. He explains another 
benefit of the alliance, which implies airlines are sharing costs in developing travel apps 
and digitalizing the travel chain together. 
 
“Star Alliance can develop these things together. Instead of everyone having an 
individual solution. That's better for the customer, and it saves resources for the 
individual airlines. Even a large airline like Lufthansa can benefit from this.” 
 
There are also challenges and disadvantages that arise from belonging to the alliance. 
He indicates that complexity and less freedom can result from partnerships, which is why 
Emirates is not a member of any strategic alliance. However, it is also emphasized by the 
interviewee that Lufthansa does not feel trapped considering the challenges. 
 
An essential component for answering the research question and analyzing the impact 
of strategic alliances on airlines' performance is Lufthansa's position in the Star Alliance 
network. Already in the company description, it is highlighted that Lufthansa is a found-
ing member of the Star Alliance. The interviewee confirms and highlights that Lufthansa 
and United are the two biggest Star Alliance members, with Air China being third. Also, 
Lufthansa and United have more weight in decision making. The respondent describes 
the position of Lufthansa in the alliance network as a central role. 
 
“For the Star Alliance, the Lufthansa Group is the anchor in Europe. […] We see 
ourselves in the role of covering Europe for the Star Alliance and our hubs are the 
main access points and distribution points for Europe.” 
 
According to the respondent, Lufthansa has a high share, which can be advantageous, 
especially for smaller airlines that can gain from Lufthansa’s size, know-how, and brand 
name. However, the interviewee also states, that the alliance might be more beneficial 
for small airlines, compared to larger airlines as Lufthansa. 
 
“I don't know whether the other way around it pays off completely for us.” 
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The interview also covered the topic concerning the performance and value of Star Alli-
ance. The respondent highlights a crucial aspect that describes a shift and development 
of the strategic alliances: 
 
“The meaning of "alliances", even though they are now of course large, and all 
major airlines belong to an alliance. But the meaning has declined relatively. They 
are still a good marketing tool for the customers. Alliances now have more of a B-
to-C focus, because they offer customers tangible added value.” 
 
When elaborating about the value of alliances further, he points out that the alliances 
are always supposed to be equally beneficial for all members. There are multiple airlines 
in each alliance, and an airline cooperates with some partners more extensively than 
with others. Moreover, Lufthansa is only cooperating to a minimum with Turkish Airlines, 
for example, since it is a strong competitor. Also, the partner airlines that are important 
for United Airlines might differ from the essential ones for Lufthansa. According to him, 
there should be a partner for everyone to cooperate with. Thus, the interviewee claims: 
 
“So partnerships at this level are always supposed to be a win-win. In that sense, 
of course, it should still be positive at the end of the day. In this respect, I don't 
want to put it too negatively. I believe that it still makes sense overall, but it varies 
greatly from one airline to another.” 
 
The interviewee illustrates that the strategic alliances are vital for Lufthansa and those 
airlines in the European market that aim to be successful. He compares it with one of 
the few airlines that is not a member of any alliance, Emirates. By contrasting the geo-
graphical setting of Lufthansa and Emirates, it becomes clear that Lufthansa has a rela-
tively small domestic market; however, aiming to be globally present. Emirates, with its 
business model and location, is not reliant on any alliance. Moreover, he claims that air-
lines would not participate in a strategic alliance if it would not make sense. 
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Another question of the interview was about change within the alliance and its impact 
on Lufthansa. An example of a change within Star Alliance was explained. The change 
occurred in 2014, when US Airways left the Star Alliance due to a merger with American 
Airlines, which is a member of oneworld. In 2015 Lufthansa expanded its route network 
and fleet. The interviewee explains that this change in the alliance did not have a signif-
icant impact due to the fact that US Airways never was an important partner for 
Lufthansa, compared to United Airlines. Interestingly, the respondent highlights that: 
 
“On the whole, US Airways was not so significant for us that it would have had any 
effect at all on our restructuring and our network. You might have noticed it in the 
results on one route or another. It would be different if United changed the camp 
or Singapore Airlines. It would be a different number, definitely.” 
 
Moreover, he elaborates on the consequences for Lufthansa, if an indispensable partner 
leaves the alliance. That means that Lufthansa either needs to fly more themselves or, if 
the number of passengers decreases for the route, Lufthansa flies less. It can also result 
in losing passengers due to the lack of connecting flights. However, those decisions need 
to be discussed case-by-case and cannot be generalized. Furthermore, he claims that 
even if an airline is not in the same alliance, they can still work together, one example is 
the cooperation between Lufthansa and Cathay. Lufthansa considers Hongkong as a rel-
evant market that they decided to work closely with Cathay. Contrary, it is also stated 
that if small European airlines such as SAS and LOT left the Star Alliance, it would not 
make any difference for Lufthansa. The interviewee mentions that the change within the 
alliance always depends on the individual airline, and he concludes: 
 
“So a new partner has a rather positive effect, if we lose a partner it has a rather 
negative effect.” 
 
Future of Alliances and alternative options 
During the interview, the topic of joint ventures came up multiple times. Moreover, the 
question was asked whether the interviewee thought joint ventures would become 
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more dominant and might even replace strategic alliances. First, he points out that joint 
ventures have increased and the trend is going towards this direction. However, in con-
trast to strategic alliances, joint ventures are not visible to the customer. The respondent 
characterizes the joint ventures important for Lufthansa because pricing and planning 
capacity is more coordinated. Thus, joint ventures have more of a B2B focus. 
 
Moreover, the interviewee explains that too many joint ventures might not make sense 
either. They are currently bilateral or trilateral agreements but he could see joint ven-
tures from the same region being linked together. According to the respondent, it would 
be beneficial for Lufthansa, however, the Asian carriers are strong competitors even 
though they are in the same alliance. Thus, it will be in the distant future. 
 
“We have, for example, three separate joint ventures to Asia, Air China only for 
China, with ANA only for Japan, and Singapore Airlines for South East Asia and Aus-
tralia. For example, is there any way to bring these three joint ventures together.” 
 
Another idea that the interviewee mentioned for the future, is a global airline holding, 
where, for example, United as an North American carrier, one Asian carrier, and 
Lufthansa for the European market would merge. By pointing out the decline in im-
portance of strategic alliances, and the decrease in airlines moving in or out of alliances, 
the interviewee claims that this is the new trend, and the alliances are simply established 
now and states: 
 
“The conclusion is that it's still nice to have but that the large entry in the future is 
now a mature product. But I do not think that this will allow us to have any more 
great fantasies for the future.” 
 
5.2.2. Finnair in the oneworld Alliance 
Development of the Airline industry and the performance of Finnair 
According to Finnair’s manager for airline partnerships and alliances, the competition 
within Europe has significantly increased, especially by existing carriers that add more 
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capacity. At the same time, competition on the long haul has been moderate. Addition-
ally, low-cost airlines have become interested in the long haul routes, such as Norwegian. 
The interviewee describes the situation at Finnair’s base airport in Helsinki, where the 
number of low-cost carriers has been relatively low compared to other airports in Europe. 
However, she also emphasized that there has been an increase in low-cost carriers in the 
last year through Ryanair and EasyJet offering routes. 
 
Moreover, the interviewee confirms Finnair's performance as positive in recent years, 
which aligns with the data from their annual reports, which was collected before the 
interview (Table 9). The airline has been very profitable and has achieved a new record 
high in passenger numbers and revenues. According to the respondent, Finnair's primary 
market is Asia and the connecting traffic between Europe and Asia, where they have 
established an important role. While their share in Europe is relatively low. The inter-
viewee claims that: 
 
“If we only talk about the Europe market, in 2019, we were the twenty second big-
gest airline in terms of capacity in Europe. So obviously, in the intra-Europe market, 
we are capacity wise not that big. But when we start to talk about the traffic flows 
between Europe to Asia, we start to be globally and especially Europe wise one of 
the biggest ones.” 
 
According to the interviewee, market conditions, including market uncertainty, custom-
ers’ needs, and the change in demand, developed over the years. Customers are becom-
ing more demanding due to the high number of choices available. Finnair is investing in 
the Premium Economy as a new seating group for the long haul routes, which will soon 
be available to cope with demanding customers. However, the interviewee also points 
out that due to the COVID-19 epidemic, customers’ needs will move towards a different 
direction, focusing more on safety. 
 
“Of course, now we will see then with COVID how it is going and what sort of pref-
erences from customers we'll after this is more maybe not that much about the 
product itself, but maybe, the safety and the feeling secured with the carriers.” 
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Moreover, the interviewee was asked about influences and changes for Finnair and the 
airline industry due to the Covid-19 epidemic. She claims that the industry collapsed and 
that the industry is as political and restrictive as before the industry's privatization when 
regulations were still in place. Furthermore, before the outbreak, people used to travel 
at affordable prices frequently. However, the need and willingness to travel are now gone, 
or people travel for shorter distances, which will be a short-and medium-term trend. The 
interviewee also considers that airlines’ key focus is now to guarantee safe travels for 
passengers. 
 
“So maybe people want to call, like, you know, for shorter distances because it 
might feel unsafe to go, very far from home. So I think that the next few years, 
maybe we have this trends. But I still personally believe, at some point we will go 
back to what we have used to.” 
 
Strategic Alliances and its performance 
The interviewee was questioned about the benefits that Finnair receives through one-
world. She elaborates that the purpose of the alliance was to widen an airline’s network, 
as it was relatedly small in the past. With the example of Finnair and Qantas, she em-
phasizes that those airlines do not compete on the same routes but create a more ex-
tensive network together, which is the original idea of the alliance. Furthermore, cost-
sharing for different development projects with all members of the partnership indicates 
another benefit. 
 
Nevertheless, the interviewee also outlines several challenges that arise from strategic 
alliances. First, when sharing costs for developments, all members need to agree with 
prior execution. This process would be too slow sometimes before everyone agrees. Sec-
ond, the alliance can be restrictive, which forces some airlines to leave the alliance. How-
ever, leaving the alliance can also be challenging, as the respondent claims: 
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“Usually it's like there are heavy barriers to exit alliances because you have stream 
light some of your processes and your systems with alliances partners.” 
 
An essential component for answering the research question and analyzing the impact 
of strategic alliances on airlines' performance is Finnair's position in the oneworld net-
work. According to the respondent, the founding members of the alliance, such as Ca-
thay, Qantas, and British Airways, are much bigger than Finnair, which gives insight into 
the airline's position within the network. Thus, it can be concluded that Finnair does not 
have a central role in the strategic alliance. 
 
“So they much bigger than Finnair. So I guess that could be used as a measure to 
think about the relevance of each member in the alliance. So based on that, of 
course we are much more smaller, smaller player within that alliance than some of 
the others.” 
 
The interview also covered the topic concerning the performance and value of one-
world. The respondent highlights a crucial aspect that describes a shift and the develop-
ment of the strategic alliances. While in the past, competition in the alliance was low 
and airlines participated to widen their network, nowadays, airlines from the same alli-
ances compete on the same routes. Alliances should be a win-win situation, but the in-
terviewee claims that the airline's size is related to the degree in benefits. Especially 
smaller airlines benefit from the alliance and, therefore, brings many benefits for Finnair. 
 
“I think for the carriers who have a smaller network they will benefit from the alli-
ance a lot because they are able to offer much more origin destination pairs. […] 
So I think, it should be a win-win, but I think so what you get out of it might be a 
little bit different depending on your size.” 
 
Even though the respondent agrees that smaller airlines get more out of the alliance 
than large airline companies, she also empathizes that large airlines can benefit from 
some small carriers. This is because they might operate routes to more unique destina-
tions that large carriers would not serve. 
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Another question of the interview was how change within the alliance affect Finnair. The 
interviewee mentions the example of the Latin American airline LATAM, that exited one-
world recently. That has a significant effect on the alliance as it was the only airline cov-
ering the Latin American geographic location, and now creates a lack of network cover-
age. However, she also points out that although oneworld might not cover Latin America, 
the alliance’s strength is to substantially cover the Australian – New Zealand region 
through Qantas, which might be less covered by other alliances. 
 
Future of Alliances and alternative options 
The final questions dealt with joint ventures and whether they would become more 
dominant in the future. The interviewee agrees that the number of joint ventures has 
increased significantly over the last years. Moreover, joint ventures characterize a more 
close form of cooperation where capacity and pricing can be discussed more concrete. 
 
“I think so. We have seen a lot of joint ventures lately forming and with those you 
have the antitrust. […] So it's kind of the step forward what comes to cooperation. 
So, I would see the trend of JVs growing and going forward.” 
 
According to the respondent, due to the COVID epidemic, the value and importance of 
alliances and other partnership types might increase because airlines operate on a 
smaller network and are more restricted. Thus, the interviewee claims that the outbreak 
might bring new forms or ideas of partnerships. She concludes that the airline’s partner-
ing will never vanish. 
 
5.2.3. Alitalia in the SkyTeam Alliance 
Development of the Airline industry and the performance of Alitalia 
The interviewee, a former vice president of strategy and business development at Alitalia, 
and partner at Bain & Company for airlines and transportation, has extensive knowledge 
about the industry and the company. He explains the development of the airline industry 
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and the performance of Alitalia. According to the interviewee, during the last 16 years 
and especially in the previous six to seven years, low-cost carriers have grown extensively 
and become an intense competition for full-service carriers. They gained substantial 
market share in Italy as it’s a market that consists mostly of inbound and leisure travels, 
which creates a suitable environment for the low-cost business model. The low-cost car-
riers offer lower fares and thus, create a more significant market share. Besides compe-
tition from low-cost airlines, also full-service carriers such as Lufthansa, Etihad, and Turk-
ish airlines compete with Alitalia on intercontinental routes. The respondent claims that 
those carriers decrease the market share of Alitalia by absorbing traffic from the airline. 
In conclusion, Alitalia has to face intense competition in the domestic and intercontinen-
tal markets. 
 
Furthermore, the interviewee predicts consolidation in the airline industry to occur. He 
claims that: 
 
“From September in the next one, two years, a significant wave of consolidation of 
airlines, so many small airlines, will not survive. All the big ones will survive let's 
say the former flag carriers will survive because they have been bailed out by the 
government, including Alitalia. The big low cost carriers will survived so EasyJet, 
Ryanair and Wizz will survive because they have tons of cash.” 
 
Concerning the performance of Alitalia, the respondent confirms that the airline has not 
been doing well over the last years. According to him, Alitalia's last close to break-even 
was in 2008, but the performance has been significantly negative since then. One reason 
for the losses is the failure to adapt to market needs, which are leisure tourism, inbound 
traffic, and short- and medium travels. This caused the airline to lose significant market 
share. The interviewee points out that Alitalia is a full-service carrier that failed the abil-
ity to market the intercontinental network. However, if Alitalia would restructure and 
change towards a low-cost operating model, they might be better in competing, grow, 
and be profitable. 
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Moreover, the interviewee describes the aviation industry as highly uncertain. He was 
asked about the influences and changes for Alitalia and the airline industry due to the 
Covid-19 epidemic. The interviewee describes that the trends about competition and 
low-cost carriers will exacerbate and that those trends will be more powerful due to the 
outbreak. Also, business travel will decline and moves toward low-cost carriers due to 
the cost-saving aspect. Furthermore, the loss of passenger share is significant, which 
might only recover in 2023 and 2024. He concludes that: 
 
“Volume has been depressed, you will see a significant reduction of yields. And a 
kind of forced restructuring of a number of airlines, of the cost structure of a num-
ber of airlines. So if you look at 2024, you will get back with the healthy traffic 
probably above 2019, healthy airlines, lower yields, and lower cost structures and 
less airlines.” 
 
Strategic Alliances and its performance 
Another topic during the interview was the strategic alliance, its benefits, and its chal-
lenges. The interviewee was questioned about the benefits that Alitalia receives through 
SkyTeam. He elaborates that the airline can offer a more extensive network of routes to 
the customers. Furthermore, members of the alliance can share costs due to consoli-
dated buying, which is particularly beneficial for smaller, less profitable airlines. The in-
terviewee points out another advantage for Alitalia being a member of SkyTeam, which 
is the gain in shares on a flow. Alitalia and Air France operate on the same route. Instead 
of offering similar flight times, they cooperate and coordinate that one airline flies in the 
morning and the other one in the evening. This way, they have the ability to dominate 
on this route and avoid competition. 
 
Nevertheless, the respondent also points out the challenges of being a member of the 
alliance. He centralizes the main problem being the loss of decision-making power. The 
decision-making process takes time and includes making sacrifices to reach a middle 
ground with other members. He claims that: 
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“If you want the alliance to really generate the benefit that we were discussing 
before, you actually need to coordinate those decisions. That's in practical terms, 
means that many times you need to take kind of suboptimal decisions for the sake 
of that alliance before in direct sake of your airline.” 
 
An essential component for answering the research question and analyzing the impact 
of strategic alliances on airlines' performance is Alitalia's position in the SkyTeam net-
work. The interviewee describes the position of Alitalia in the strategic alliance as ex-
tremely weak. The central role is to cover the Italian market where the airline's market 
share is relatively low, leading to a rather limited role in SkyTeam. 
 
The interview also covered the topic concerning the performance and value of SkyTeam. 
He claims that the alliance is always supposed to be a win-win for everybody. Moreover, 
he highlights that it is a good way of coordination where a high number of airlines in an 
alliance are more beneficial than small alliances. However, he also mentions that if Alita-
lia is not a member of SkyTeam anymore, it would be a small airline with few connections 
and, thus, not attractive for anybody because it doesn’t fly anywhere. According to the 
interviewee, as a small company, Alitalia is significantly benefiting from the alliance, 
while other member airlines only benefit from Alitalia when operating in the Italian mar-
ket. It improves the performance and allows Alitalia to take advantage of the scale of 
bigger ones in buying and sharing services. 
 
Another discussion was the impact of change within SkyTeam on Alitalia. The inter-
viewee states, if a new airline enters the alliance, that: 
 
“So it's by definition a positive addition to you. Can be a huge addition. Or it can be 
a very limited addition, depending how much your customer base uses the products 





Future of Alliances and alternative options 
The final two questions dealt with developing other forms of partnerships such as joint 
ventures and the future of strategic alliances. The interviewee agrees that joint ventures 
have been growing in recent years and that it is a form of partnership that characterizes 
stronger cooperation between airlines. They will become more valuable and more im-
portant. Moreover, the respondent mentions a revolution for the future, which are 
shared services. Those services, such as Administration, or IT, would not be in every 
country, but the alliance would share one center responsible for all member airlines. 
According to the interviewee: 
 
“So that again is gaining value from scale. To me, those would be fundamental 
elements for Alitalia, if they manage do it through Sky Team because they would 
overcome the limits of being small.” 
 
Table 10. Results of Single Case Studies 
 Lufthansa Finnair Alitalia 




ously from 2017 to 
2019 
Profitable; record high 
in passenger numbers 
and revenues 
Bad; negative perfor-
mance since 2008; fail-
ure to adapt 
Geographical 
coverage 
Globally present Low market share in Eu-
rope; extensive cover-
age to Asia 
Mostly Italian market 
Market  
uncertainty 
Adaption to new cus-
tomer trends and to 
changes to stay com-
petitive 
More demanding cus-
tomers, and high num-
ber of choices; adapt to 
market changes 
Highly uncertain indus-
try; customers demand 
low cost fares 
Competition  
intensity 
Intense competition of 
LCCs and FSCs but have 
not grown intense any-
more; LH aggressively 
fights threats 
Competition has in-
creased, LCCs start op-
erating from Helsinki 
airport 
Intense competition 
from LCCs and FSCs that 
decrease market share 
of Alitalia; consolidation 
during next two years 
COVID Less demand and cor-
porate travel, faster and 
more short-term mar-
ket changes, aggressive 
competitive behavior 
Political and restrictive 
industry; need to travel 
is gone or only short dis-
tance, more focus on 
safety 
Depressed volume of 
passengers; forced re-
structuring of airlines’ 
cost structure;  
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Strategic Alliances and its performance 
Position in  
Alliance 
Central position; Anchor 
in Europe 
Small position; founding 
members are bigger 
Small and extremely 
weak role 
Value of Alliance Gives more to the alli-
ance than receives; 




lines benefit most, ben-
eficial for Finnair 
Supposed to be win-
win, small airline like 
Alitalia benefits from al-
liance 
Change in  
Alliance 
new partner has rather 
positive effect; exit has 
a rather negative effect 
Depending on the air-
line, it can have a huge 
effect 
New member is posi-
tive, can be a huge or a 
minimal addition 
Future of Alliances and alternative options 
Future of  
Alliance 
Partnership is vital in Eu-
rope; global airline 
holding, or regional JVs 
Partnerships will never 
vanish; become more 
important due to COVID 
Revolution: shared ser-




JVs is a trend, they are 
more coordinated and 
have increased 
JVs have increased sig-
nificantly; closer form of 
cooperation 
JVs has grown, stronger 
cooperation; they be-
come more important 
 
 
5.3. Cross Case Analysis 
To answer the research question, there is a need to compare the interviews' findings of 
the three case companies. The cross-case analysis follows a similar structure to the con-
ducted interviews and single-case analysis. First, the focus is on the airline industry's 
analysis, its development, including the influence of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the 
performance of the case companies. Second, an analysis of the alliances is conducted, 
including the benefits and challenges, the airline's position in the alliance, as well as how 
change within the alliance impacts the airline's performance. Finally, the chapter closes 
with the analysis of the future of alliances and alternative options. All in all, the findings 
are examined and analyzed in connection with the theoretical framework. 
 
5.3.1. Development of Airline industry and the performance of airlines 
The airline industry has become more competitive over the last decade and is facing high 
uncertainty. Especially the low-cost business model has become a strong competition for 
full-service carriers. Furthermore, they do not only operate from secondary airports 
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anymore but have extended their network to hub airports (Lieshout et al., 2016). All 
interviewees confirm the development and growth of competition. However, the threat 
is viewed differently by the three interviewees. For Lufthansa, a large airline with a global 
presence, that had an excellent performance and grew continuously during the last three 
years, low-cost carriers are not seen as a considerable threat. That is because Lufthansa 
follows an aggressive strategy at its hubs to prevent competition from becoming too 
large. For Finnair, a relatively small airline with a low market share in Europe feels the 
threat of low-cost carriers increasingly since they started operating more routes from 
Helsinki airport. And for Alitalia, a small airline with a continuous negative performance 
during the last years and a geographical coverage mostly within the Italian market is at-
tacked by low-cost carriers that decrease the airline’s market share. Thus, market share 
not only functions as a performance indicator (Park and Cho 1997). But market share 
and airline size are also indicators of how competition and threats are viewed and impact 
the airline. 
 
Aforementioned, Lufthansa has a global presence with an extended route network. Fin-
nair, on the other hand, is relatively small within Europe. However, as the interviewee 
states, Finnair focuses on the route network from Europe to Asia, characterized by ex-
tensive coverage. Contrary, Alitalia has a rather small network and lost substantial mar-
ket share on intercontinental and domestic routes and only has some market share on 
key routes from its hub in Rome. Gudmundsson and Lechner (2006) identify the route 
network as one essential asset for airlines. Moreover, according to Gudmundsson and 
Lechner (2006), the uniqueness of resources that create a competitive advantage is es-
sential for an airline's performance. The researchers’ findings align with the performance 
of the case studies, and makes Lufthansa and Finnair valuable airlines with unique assets, 
while Alitalia cannot achieve a competitive advantage. 
 
Moreover, Finnair’s and Lufthansa's interviewees point out that customers have become 
more demanding due to the high number of options available. According to 
Gudmundsson and Lechner (2006), the customer base is another critical asset of an 
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airline. Therefore, it is essential to adapt to market changes and customer needs to stay 
competitive and keep customers. Lufthansa already implemented the Premium Econ-
omy as a new seating class, and Finnair is currently integrating it. In contrast, Alitalia is 
not adapting to customer needs as the interviewee states. As Italy is an inbound market 
with tourists that focus on low-cost fares, Alitalia did not change its business model and 
thus, failed to react to the demand. Therefore, Finnair's and Lufthansa’s overall excellent 
performance can be reasoned based on unique resources and success in adapting to 
market changes and customer needs. While on the other side, Alitalia could not create 
a competitive advantage by changing its strategy and business model to meet customer 
demands. Therefore, the lack of competitive advantage, a large customer base, and ex-
tensive network lead to a negative performance (Gudmundsson & Lechner, 2006). 
 
All interviewees refer to the current COVID-19 epidemic and its extensive effects on the 
entire airline industry. The IATA (2020) also points out the enormous impact of the ex-
ternal environment and that, especially large airlines, the former national carriers can 
receive financial aid from the government. All interviewees forecast a lower demand, 
notably less business travel. Additionally, the uncertainty leads to faster, and more short-
term market changes and a more aggressive competitive behavior, based on the 
Lufthansa interviewee. According to the interviewee of Alitalia, the crisis leads to a 
forced restructuring of the cost structure. Based on the interviewee's forecasts and the 
IATA's (2020) statement, the outcome of the COVID epidemic will have a similar effect 
on the airline industry as the financial crisis. During the financial crisis in 2008, low-cost 
carriers increased substantially and experienced a boom due to the change in travel be-
havior (Goyal & Negi, 2014). Due to the trends of not traveling long distances by plane 
and traveling less for business but more for leisure, it can lead to growing demand in 
low-cost carriers again. 
 
Furthermore, a report by KPMG (2018) suggests that consolidation within the airline in-
dustry will increase in the next years. They state, “Europe is a mature aviation market, 
which is considered to be in the early stages of a wave of consolidation that is expected 
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to continue for the near term” (KPMG, 2018, p. 27). That is confirmed by Alitalia's inter-
viewee, who predicts that the flag carriers will survive due to a bailout by the state. Also, 
the big low-cost carriers such as EasyJet and Ryanair will survive. However, small airlines 
will disappear or consolidate with existing airlines due to the epidemic, intense compe-
tition, and low fares. Nevertheless, according to Lufthansa's interviewee, during the next 
years, it will not be possible to have some flag carriers buy small airlines. That is because, 
Lufthansa, for example, received state aid during the epidemic and cannot afford to con-
solidate with another airline. 
 
5.3.2. Strategic Alliances and its performance 
Cooperating with competitors can have multiple advantages such as access to resources 
(Bengtsson & Kock, 2000), cost sharing (Luo, 2007), and according to Peng et al. (2012), 
it also increases the speed in market-entry and market share. Additionally, strategic alli-
ances allow passengers to take advantage of a frequent flyer program, access to lounges, 
and seamless travel (Pels, 2001). Those are benefits that are also mentioned by the three 
interviewees. Lufthansa's interviewee also points out that it creates a quality promise 
for passengers where airlines have similar standards and quality levels. He also points 
out that combined marketing can be done. However, Lufthansa does not depend on that 
due to its strong brand itself. Contrary, Alitalia, as a smaller and less profitable airline, 
benefits extensively from cost-sharing, market share, and marketing. Even though Alita-
lia has those advantages from the alliance, it does not improve its operating efficiency, 
which aligns with Min and Joo (2016) results, who argues that it is not clear if strategic 
alliances create value for airlines. 
 
All interviewees mention similar challenges of cooperating with competitors in the form 
of strategic alliances. They highlight the complexity of decision making and less freedom. 
However, Lufthansa indicates not feeling trapped in the alliance, while Finnair points out 
that the alliance can be restrictive, and Alitalia further emphasizes that being in an alli-
ance includes making sacrifices to reach a decision. The difference in perceived chal-
lenges can be related to the position in the alliance. Lufthansa has a central role in the 
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alliance and is a founding member of Star Alliance. According to the interviewee of 
Lufthansa, they experience more decision-making power than other members. That con-
trasts to Finnair and Alitalia and thus, reasons the different perceptions. This matches 
with the findings by Sanou et al. (2016), who emphasize that a central position leads to 
various benefits. 
 
Aforementioned, Lufthansa has a central position in the alliance. It is the anchor in Eu-
rope, and the hubs are the primary access and distribution points in Europe for the Star 
Alliance. Contrary, Finnair has a small position in oneworld compared to the founding 
members, which are bigger in size. Furthermore, Alitalia has an extremely weak and mi-
nor role in SkyTeam. The study by Sanou et al. (2016) examines the influence of a firm's 
position in a network on market performance. The findings show that a firm's position 
is an indicator of superior performance. Also, Gudmundsson and Lechner (2006) high-
light the importance of the actor’s position within a network that impacts performance. 
The findings align with Lufthansa’s and Alitalia’s position and corresponding perfor-
mance. The central position of Lufthansa indicates superior performance, and vice versa, 
the weak position of Alitalia shows a low performance. However, Finnair has a small po-
sition in the alliance, but an overall good market performance. 
 
According to Lufthansa and Finnair, strategic alliances have changed since its emergence 
and describe different developments. Lufthansa’s interviewee mentions that strategic 
alliances now have more of a B2C focus, which functions as a useful marketing tool for 
customers, such as the frequent flyer programs and lounge accesses. At the same time, 
the meaning of alliances has declined. Finnair’s interviewee describes a different devel-
opment, which is that the founding purpose is not centralized anymore. Nowadays, air-
lines compete on the same routes with alliance members, while the intended goal was 
to collaborate with competitors to broaden the route network. The development can be 
explained with the resource-based view. According to the resource-based view, firms 
are building relationships with rivals in order to get access to unique resources 
(Bengtsson & Kock, 2000). Also, Gyawali and Park (2009) emphasize that firms or 
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networks get access to resources that would otherwise be inaccessible on their own. 
This way, firms can develop a competitive advantage. This reasons the grounding pur-
pose of the alliance. 
 
However, Gnyawali and Park (2011) point out that even if they have similar and comple-
mentary resources, in this case, the same routes, it allows firms to take advantage of 
economies of scale. Additionally, competitors' resources enable firms to save costs and 
time (Gnyawali & Park, 2009). This aligns with the example the interviewee of Alitalia 
mentioned. Alitalia and Air France operate on the same route. Instead of offering similar 
flight times, they cooperate and coordinate that one airline flies in the morning and the 
other one in the evening. This way, they have the ability to dominate on this route and 
avoid competition. That argument can be used to explain the development that Finnair 
experiences, where members of the same alliance cover the same route. 
 
The alliance network consists of multiple airlines that aim for mutual value creation and 
individual value appropriation (Sanou et al., 2016). Bengtsson et al. (2010) describe that 
those network relationships vary and can be cooperative or competitive connections. 
That corresponds with Lufthansa’s interviewee statement, who explains that some air-
lines in the alliance network cooperate extensively, while other airlines avoid cooperat-
ing with specific airlines. For example, Lufthansa keeps the cooperation with Turkish Air-
lines to a minimum as it a strong competitor. 
 
All interviewees claim that the strategic alliance is a win-win situation for all members. 
However, when further discussing the topic of whether the alliance benefits all airlines 
equally, they highlight that the size of the airline is connected to the additional benefits 
received from alliances. Lufthansa points out that small airlines can benefit from their 
size, know-how, and brand name. Additionally, Lufthansa states: “I don't know whether 
the other way around it pays off completely for us.” Finnair explains that small airlines 
can access to a broader network, and that Finnair itself benefits a lot from the alliance. 
Also, the interviewee of Alitalia emphasizes that small airlines like Alitalia significantly 
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benefit from the alliance. He points out that if Alitalia is not a member of SkyTeam any-
more, it would be a small airline with few connections and, thus, not attractive for any-
body because it does not fly anywhere. 
 
Based on the statements by the interviewees of the three case companies, alliances are 
supposed to be a win-win, but small airlines, such as Finnair and Alitalia, get more out 
of the alliance than large airlines like Lufthansa. That corresponds to a study by Gnywali 
and Madhavan (2001), who claim that not all firms have the same benefits from a 
coopetitive network. However, their result is that the firm's structural embeddedness 
within the network impacts competitive behaviour. Notwithstanding, this might be true, 
but in this case, an airline's structural embeddedness in the alliance affects the benefits 
that can be drawn up from other members. Furthermore, also Doganis (2005, p. 279) 
concluded that alliances would create imbalance and that “one partner feels it is getting 
much less out of the alliance than the other partner(s)”. Additionally, the resource de-
pendence theory explains that firms form coopetitive relations to get access to resources 
they do not control by themselves. According to a study conducted by Lechner et al. 
(2016), young and small firms gain from vertical coopetition relationships to larger firms. 
Based on the interviewee’s responses, this is true not only for vertical coopetition but 
also for horizontal coopetition. 
 
According to Ritala (2012), coopetition is beneficial when market conditions are highly 
uncertain. This aligns with Finnair's statement, who points out that the importance of 
the strategic alliance and other partnerships could increase again due to the COVID epi-
demic. However, Ritala (2012) also claims that firms do not achieve additional value in 
coopetition relationships when market uncertainty is low. This is not the case for the 
airline industry. Airlines achieve additional value through cooperation with competitors. 
However, it needs to be pointed out that the airline industry is highly dynamic. Thus, 
airlines continuously need to face changes and external influences, and therefore, the 
airline industry's uncertainty is never low. 
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Although the interviewees describe that there has not been much movement of carriers 
joining or exiting the alliances during the last years, some changes occurred, and they 
had different impacts on the airlines. In the Star Alliance, US Airways, an American car-
rier, left the alliance, which was not a strong cooperating partner for Lufthansa. Thus, 
the impact on Lufthansa was rather low. However, the interviewee also mentions that 
if a strong cooperating partner such as United or Singapore left the Star Alliance, it would 
have a massive impact on Lufthansa. This corresponds to the findings of Johanson and 
Mattsson (1988), which are that the construct of nodes and relations makes the firm 
vulnerable to unexpected changes. For example, if one firm is closing its operations, the 
relationship is breaking down, and the knowledge and resource flow is interrupted. 
 
The Latin American airline LATAM recently left oneworld, which creates a structural hole 
in the Latin American region for the alliance. It indicates the importance of specific air-
lines for the alliance that brings unique resources to the network. That equals Luo’s 
(2007) findings, who emphasizes that the geographical location of the global rivals can 
be crucial. Actors in diverse geographic areas might offer access to specific resources. 
That links to Gudmundsson’s and Lechner’s (2016, p. 154) findings that the uniqueness 
in resources enables airlines to fill structural holes, which is “unserved space in a net-
work that can be exploited as a result of brokering connections between disconnected 
segments generating social capital”. 
 
The lack of unique resources and the inability to fill a structural hole in the network leads 
to Alitalia’s negative market share and performance. Their only responsibility in SkyTeam 
is to cover the Italian market since they do not have other unique resources. The afore-
mentioned low-cost carriers have a significant market share in Italy due to the inbound 
traffic for leisure. According to the interviewee of Alitalia, long haul traffic from Italy is 
mostly from Milan, where passengers can take intercontinental flights from Malpensa 
airport, which is one hour from Milan. The other option is a point-to-point connection 
from the Milan city airport, Linate, to Frankfurt, for example, entering the intercontinen-
tal flight there. The interviewee mentions that time is the same. Thus, as the interviewee 
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states, without SkyTeam, Alitalia would be a small and unimportant airline, which is why 
every new partner is somewhat favorable for the airline. 
 
The three interviewees come to the same conclusion about the impact of change within 
an alliance when an airline enters the alliance or a member exits. They agree that a new 
partner has a positive effect, and the leaving of an airline is rather negative for the other 
members. However, as the interviewee of Finnair states, it always depends on the airline 
if it has a vast or limited effect. Suppose it was a valuable partner with essential connec-
tions. In that case, it has a great impact on the airline, and if it were a partner, the airline 
had limited cooperation with, the effect would be relatively limited. Also, Alitalia’s inter-
viewee explains that a new member is, in general, positive and can be a huge or a mini-
mal addition to the airline. 
 
Klophaus and Lordan (2018) analysed the vulnerability of the three largest airline alli-
ances if an airline would exit the alliance. That would lead to the deletion of routes if 
not covered by another member airline. The study’s findings are that oneworld is the 
most vulnerable alliance, followed by SkyTeam and Star Alliance. According to the ex-
ample mentioned, where LATAM leaves oneworld and creates a structural hole in the 
network’s geographical coverage, it can be argued that oneworld is the most vulnerable 
alliance. However, based on Lufthansa's interview, if an airline leaves the alliance it does 
not necessarily mean that the route must be deleted from the network, but that the 
airlines need to fly more themselves. Nevertheless, if the number of passengers de-
creases for the route, the airline flies less. It can also result in losing passengers due to 
the lack of connecting flights. 
 
Something that has been noticed during the interviews is the diverse importance of stra-
tegic alliances. Additionally, it created the perception that airlines get different perfor-
mance benefits out of the alliance. Based on the interviews, the more central the air-
line's position is within the alliance network, the lower the additional benefits for the 
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airline. Also, a central position leads to giving more to other member airlines than getting 
out of the partnership. The key facts are summarized and presented in Table 11. 
 
Table 11. Evaluation of Strategic Alliances based on interviewed companies 
 Lufthansa Finnair Alitalia 
Position in Alliance Central Small-medium Small 
Benefits of Alliance Medium-low High High 
Importance of Alliance Decreasing High High 
Value of Joint Ventures Increasing Increasing Increasing 
 
According to the interviewees, strategic alliances are essential, especially for smaller air-
lines with a less central position in the network. Thus, Finnair and Alitalia can take differ-
ent benefits from the alliance, such as cost-sharing, market share, and brand awareness. 
Contrary, for Lufthansa, the strategic alliance’s value has declined, and other forms of 
partnerships have become more crucial, such as joint ventures. The relation between 
the importance of strategic alliances and the size of airlines is visualized in Figure 17. 
 
 
Figure 17. Importance of Strategic Alliances for Airlines 
 
5.3.3. Future of alliances and alternative options 
Strategic alliances exist for more than 20 years and characterize a network of nodes and 
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agree that, during the last years, another form of partnership, joint ventures, has be-
come more dominant. According to them, due to the growth of joint ventures, it indi-
cates a new trend. Their perception aligns with the one from Bilotkach (2019), who also 
highlights that another form of cooperation between airlines has grown in popularity. 
He noticed that during the last decade, primarily joint ventures had been used. Finnair’s 
and Alitalia’s interviewees point out that this partnership represents more close coop-
eration where specific points can be discussed, such as pricing and capacity. A joint ven-
ture is the “closest thing that the airlines could have to a merger in the current institu-
tional and regulatory environment” (Bilotkach, 2019, p. 52). Additionally, joint ventures 
have a more B2B function com-pared to alliances that developed to a rather B2C tool. 
 
As joint ventures become more powerful and more relevant, Lufthansa’s interviewee 
also indicates that too many joint venture agreements do not make sense. According to 
Ritala (2012), firms that select only a few key competitors to cooperate with, achieve a 
better market performance than with a high number of cooperating rivals. This is only 
true for a large airline like Lufthansa, which gives more to the alliance than gain from it. 
However, based on the interviews, for Alitalia and Finnair, rather small airlines, coopeti-
tion with many airlines is more beneficial. 
 
Currently, there are mostly bilateral and trilateral joint venture agreements, with an ex-
ception being the Atlantic joint venture. For Lufthansa, further development of joint ven-
tures would be if the individual joint ventures from the same region would be linked 
together. For example, Lufthansa has joint ventures with Air China, ANA in Japan, and 
Singapore airlines, and could see them join together to form one Asia joint venture. 
 
Aforementioned, strategic alliances are especially beneficial for small airlines such as 
Finnair and Alitalia. However, as a large airline, Lufthansa can also benefit from alliances 
due to its relatively small home market. He denotes that airlines within Europe are more 
dependent on strategic alliances than airlines with a unique geographical location such 
as Emirates. The interviewee of Lufthansa mentions a formation that would benefit the 
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large airline mostly. It is the idea of a global airline holding where the large airlines from 
each region merge, for example, United as a North American carrier, one Asian carrier, 
and Lufthansa for the European market. Alitalia’s interviewee points out another revo-
lution of cooperation with competitors. All members of an alliance could share services 
and only have one IT or Admin center for the entire alliance. He claims that this would 
overcome the limitations of being a small airline, as Alitalia. 
 
Especially the interviewee of Lufthansa highlights the decline and importance of strate-
gic alliances and sees them as established now. Finnair’s interviewee points out that air-
line partnerships will never disappear. The value of alliances and other forms of partner-
ship could substantially increase in value due to the COVID epidemic. That is because the 
airline industry has become more restrictive during the outbreak of the virus. Thus, air-




5.4. Revised Theoretical Model 
Based on the previous analysis, a revised theoretical model has been created to include 
the research findings and complement the framework regarding the impact of coopeti-
tion in the form of strategic alliances on airlines’ market performance. As illustrated, the 
airline industry is dynamic, characterized by intense competition, and cooperation with 
other airlines is practiced. Previous studies about the impact of strategic alliances on 
airlines’ performance show mixed outcomes. By using different variables as measure-
ments for the data collection and interviews, the effect of coopetition on airlines’ market 
performance could be evaluated. This thesis's key findings are added to the framework 
and include that overall strategic alliances are positively for airlines, especially within 
Europe, where the domestic market is limited. However, small airlines benefit the most 
rather than large carriers. Moreover, the current COVID epidemic has not been consid-
ered in previous studies since it’s spread in 2020. The virus is a considerable negative 
external factor that has a massive impact on airlines and the entire airline industry. Based 
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6. Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter aims to summarize the master’s thesis’s findings and delineate the theoret-
ical contribution. The results centralize the impact of coopetition in the form of strategic 
alliances on airlines’ market performance. Nevertheless, the findings on the develop-
ment and future of the airline industry and partnerships are also outlined. Moreover, 
this section proposes theoretical and managerial implications. Finally, this chapter points 
out the limitations and proposes possible future research avenues in the field of coopeti-
tion, strategic alliances, and the airline industry. 
 
 
6.1. Summary of results and theoretical contribution 
This thesis aimed to increase the understanding of the impact of coopetition in the form 
of strategic alliances on airlines' market performance. For this study, three airlines, 
Lufthansa, Finnair, and Alitalia, have been used as case companies that are located 
within Europe. The aim was to answer the research question: “How does coopetition in 
the form of strategic alliances impact the market performance of airlines?” 
 
Lufthansa, Finnair, and Alitalia are three airlines within Europe, each operating in a dif-
ferent alliance. Moreover, these airlines differ in size and geographical coverage. The 
German carrier Lufthansa has unique resources due to its global presence, and the ex-
tensive route network allows for a competitive advantage. Furthermore, the last three 
years have been one of the best in terms of performance. On the contrary, Finnair is a 
relatively small airline within Europe but offers essential assets by focusing its network 
on routes between Asia and Europe. During the last few years, the high revenue and 
passenger numbers have led to the best performance in the carrier's history. Alitalia, also 
a small airline, has had a negative performance over the past decade and is losing market 
share to other full-service carriers and low-cost carriers. The airline is not able to meet 
customer needs and to develop unique resources. The empirical results confirm Gud-
mundsson and Lechner (2006) findings on the uniqueness of resources that create a 
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competitive advantage and are essential for an airline's performance. The researchers’ 
findings align with the case companies' performance and make Lufthansa and Finnair 
valuable airlines with unique assets, while Alitalia cannot achieve a competitive ad-
vantage. 
 
Concluding statement 1: Partnerships contribute positively to airlines 
 
The empirical findings characterize cooperating with competitors in strategic alliances 
as positive by pointing out various benefits such as cost-sharing, joint development, and 
similar standards. This is consistent with the findings of previous studies concerning the 
advantages and disadvantages of strategic alliances. Even though Min and Joo (2016), 
argue that it is not clear if strategic alliances create value for airlines, further analysis 
showed that especially small airlines get benefits out of the partnership with larger air-
lines. This study provides additional support for advantages through economies of scale 
when operating on the same routes with alliance partners. This matches Gnyawali and 
Park (2009) findings, who claim that competitors’ resources enable firms to save costs 
and time. By operating on the same route with coopetitors, airlines from the same alli-
ance can dominate the route, save costs, and avoid other competitors. 
 
Moreover, it is crucial to note that large airlines with a relatively small domestic market, 
like Lufthansa, benefit from alliances. This demonstrates how vital strategic alliances, or 
other partnerships, are for airlines within Europe. Those airlines are more dependent on 
strategic alliances than airlines with a unique geographical location such as Emirates. 
 
This study provides considerable insight into the impact of change within a strategic al-
liance on airlines. As indicated by Johanson and Mattson (1988), a network of nodes and 
relations make firms vulnerable to unexpected changes. This corresponds to the empir-
ical findings where the exit from the alliance of a strong cooperating partner has a mas-
sive impact on the airline. That is because actors from diverse geographical are-as offer 
access to specific resources. The empirical results highlight that a new partner in the 
strategic alliance positively affects the other member airlines, while an airline's leaving 
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is rather negative. Nevertheless, it needs to be considered that it always depends on the 
airline, whether it has a vast or limited effect. The findings can be extended by the out-
come of a member leaving the alliance. It does not need to harm the airline’s route net-
work. However, airlines need to fly more themselves. The worst-case scenario would be 
if the number of passengers decreases for the route, the airline needs to fly less or loses 
passengers due to the lack of connecting flights. 
 
Concluding statement 2: Small airlines gain most from coopetition through alliances 
 
Concluding statement 2 a: Airlines with a central position in the alliance give more than 
they gain 
 
The empirical findings are in line with previous results by Gnywali and Madhavan (2001), 
who claim that not all firms have the same benefits from coopetitive networks. Further 
analysis showed that the size of an airline is connected to additional benefits received 
from alliances. More precisely, small airlines can benefit from large airlines within the 
same strategic alliance, including size, know-how, and brand name. That extends Lechner 
et al. (2016) findings, which state that small firms gain from vertical coopetition relation-
ships to larger firms. This study's findings widen the knowledge that small firms also gain 
from horizontal coopetition relation-ships. Small firms gain more from coopetition rela-
tionships than large carriers because they access resources they do not control them-
selves. 
 
Interestingly, based on the analysis and empirical findings, the more central the airline's 
position is within the alliance network, the lower the airline's additional benefits. While 
a central role in the alliance allows for more decision making power, it also leads to giving 
more to other alliance members than getting out of the partnership. Although Gnywali 
and Madhavan (2001) found that not all firms have the same benefits from a coopetitive 
network. Their result is that the firm's structural embeddedness within the network im-
pacts competitive behavior. That could not be confirmed in this thesis, but in this case, 
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an airline's structural embeddedness in the alliance affects the benefits that can be 
drawn up from other members. As proposed by Sanou et al. (2016), a firm's position 
indicates superior performance. Gudmundsson and Lechner (2006) also point out the 
importance of an actor's position within a network that impacts the performance. These 
findings correlate well with those empirical findings, where an airline with a central role 
represents better performance. 
 
Concluding statement 3: Value of alliances is declining, and JVs become more important 
 
The empirical findings offer unique evidence that strategic alliances have become less 
valuable for large airlines with a central position in the alliance network. Those airlines 
focus increasingly on joint ventures characterized as a B2B tool, whereas strategic alli-
ances turned to a rather B2C tool that benefits passengers more than the airlines itself. 
The shift towards joint ventures as a tool to cooperate with competitors has also been 
noted by Bilotkach (2019). Nevertheless, this research also found out that small airlines 
with a less central position in the alliance favor strategic alliances because the higher the 
number of partners, the wider their network and thus, create more offers for customers. 
All in all, airlines have different ideas on how the types of partnerships could develop in 
the future, from a single administration center for the entire alliance or a global airline 
holding. But the results underline that partnerships in the airline industry will never dis-
appear, especially not within Europe. 
 
Concluding statement 4: External impact: COVID 
 
This study allowed to obtain comprehensive results on the impact of external factors on 
the airline industry. Based on the empirical findings, the current COVID epidemic im-
pacts the airline industry heavily and causes lower demand in traveling, focus on low-
cost carriers, and extensive restrictions for passengers and airlines. Furthermore, ac-
cording to the interviewees, it leads to faster industry changes and more aggressive 
competition. Since the airline industry has been characterised as highly uncertain and 
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continuously changing, coopetition is beneficial (Ritala, 2012). The findings of this thesis 
suggests that the low-cost business model will have its second boom due to the crisis. 
Also, an airline consolidation will take place, because small airlines go bankrupt in the 
COVID crisis and disappear. 
 
 
6.2. Managerial implications 
This thesis has revealed that coopetition through strategic alliances in the airline indus-
try is crucial, even though the airlines' level of importance varies. The findings of this 
thesis have considerable managerial implications. The airline industry is highly competi-
tive, even though the number of players did not change significantly over the past few 
years. First, an important managerial implication is that the customer base and the route 
network are crucial assets for an airline, making it attractive for cooperating airlines. It 
is vital for airlines to continuously evaluate and meet customers' needs to offer unique 
resources to achieve good performance. Without a competitive advantage and unique 
resources, it can lead to loss of market share and negatively affect performance. 
 
Second, in a highly uncertain industry like the airline industry, partnerships of any kind 
are crucial. The type of partnership for the specific airline might vary from either a high 
number of coopetitors to only a few members. That is related to the size of the airline 
and its resources. It needs to be evaluated what unique resources an airline owns and 
which are lacking. Large airlines obtain the most crucial resources on their own, while 
small airlines are dependent on competitors. Thus, airlines need to assess whether to 
share unique resources with many other players or focus on a few airlines as partners to 
keep some of the competitive advantages. 
 
This thesis has revealed that the current COVID crisis has hit the airline industry heavily, 
and the recovery will take several years. It will cause several changes within airline com-
panies as well as the whole industry. Managers need to expect less demand for long-
haul flights, less corporate travel and need to consider safety regulations. Moreover, full-
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service carriers offer additional value, which comes at a higher price compared to low-
cost carriers. Due to the epidemic, it is expected that travelers focus on lower fare prices 
and, thus, choose the low-cost business model over the full-service business model. Even 
though network carriers cannot offer as low fares as low-cost carriers, it is recommended 




6.3. Limitations and Future research 
The interpretation of the presented results of this master’s thesis has to be seen in the 
light of several limitations. First, the focus is on the airline industry in an international 
setting. Thus, the generalization of the literature on coopetition needs to be assessed 
carefully. Second, the case study is conducted with three airlines of different sizes, from 
three different countries (Germany, Finland, and Italy), and which operate in three dif-
ferent alliances. Nevertheless, the empirical results should be applied with caution to 
other airlines from different geographical regions as the setting might be different than 
in the European airline market. 
 
Another limitation concerns the access to suitable candidates for the empirical data col-
lection through semi-structured interviews. The crisis caused by COVID did not allow me 
to find more than one qualified candidate for the interviews. Even though the candidates 
were professionals with many years of industry experience, a second interviewee per 
airline would have strengthened their statements. Furthermore, as Italian law does not 
require companies to publish their annual financial statements and key figures. It re-
sulted in only limited data being available for the Italian carrier Alitalia. That did not allow 
to create a table with key figures as for the German and Finnish airlines. Also, it hindered 
comparing the statements mentioned by the interviewee of Alitalia with the key figures 
of the annual report, including revenue and EBIT. 
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The interviewees’ subjectivity could have influenced the empirical collection technique 
in the form of semi-structured interviews. Nevertheless, information collected through 
primary sources is consistent with the data available and gathered beforehand. When 
interviewing people, subjectivity is expected, and it may be considered an unintentional 
human cognitive bias. 
 
This study is the first step towards enhancing the understanding of the impact of coopeti-
tion on airlines’ market performance as well as whether strategic alliances are a coopeti-
tion tool that has future potential. This research has raised some questions in need of 
further investigation about joint ventures. According to the interviewees, joint ventures 
are increasing as a tool for cooperating with competitors more closely. Future studies 
should thoroughly examine the benefits and disadvantages of joint ventures for airlines 
compared to strategic alliances. Moreover, the value that airlines gain from joint ven-
tures in contrast to strategic alliances should be further investigated. This also includes 
the possibility that joint ventures could replace strategic alliances in the future. 
 
An interesting issue to resolve for future studies is the impact of the COVID epidemic and 
how far this has changed the airline industry in various matters. For example, interview-
ees pointed out that the virus and related travel restrictions could increase the im-
portance of alliances and other forms of partnerships because airlines cannot travel far. 
Moreover, passengers are not traveling as far and looking for cheaper options. Based on 
interviewees’ statements, this could lead to the next low-cost carrier boom. Thus, this 
can be a future development and requires further research. 
 
The results of this thesis are encouraging and should be validated by larger sample size. 
Moreover, to fully understand the relationship between large airlines and the low im-
portance of strategic alliances in contrast to small airlines and increasing the significance 
of alliance partnerships, further research should focus on samples where the airlines are 
of similar size and in the same geographical area. This is suggested to verify the results 
of this thesis.   
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Appendix 1. Star Alliance Members 
Member Destinations Countries Annual Passengers Fleet Size 
Aegean Airlines 134 44 7.19m 49 
Air Canada 218 63 50,9m 397 
Air China 189 42 33,14m 397 
Air India 123 31 21,8m 127 
Air New Zealand 51 17 17m 113 
ANA 98 23 53,9m (FY2017) 266 
Asiana Airlines 76 22 18,9m 84 
Austrian 130 58 13,9m 83 
Avianca 102 27 30,5m 190 
Brussels Airlines 118 49 10m 48 
Copa Airlines 81 33 14,3m 104 
Croatia Airlines 39 24 2,17m 12 
EGYPTAIR 72 47 7,54m 69 
Ethiopian Airlines 126 75 10,63m 108 
EVA Air 58 18 12,5m 79 
LOT Polish Airlines 90 50 9m 75 
Lufthansa 214 75 70,1m 351 
Scandinavian Airlines 126 >30 30m 156 
Shenzhen Airlines 84 10 31,32m 215 
Singapore Airlines 63 32 19,51m 112 
South African Airways 32 22 6,8m 46 
SWISS >100 44 17,9m 90 
TAP Air Portugal 93 36 16m 99 
Thai Airways International 76 31 25m 102 
Turkish Airlines (TK) 311 124 75,17m 335 
 135 
United Airlines (UA) 353 58 158m 1,329 
(Star Alliance, 2019) 
 
 
Appendix 2. oneworld Members 
Member Destinations Countries Annual Passengers Fleet Size 
American Airlines 370 61 215m 1,547 
British Airways 240 85 48m 333 
Cathay Pacific 106 35 35m 201 
Fiji Airways 36 14 2m 11 
Finnair 136 46 15m 85 
Iberia 145 46 22m 152 
Japan Airlines 84 21 44m 216 
Malaysia Airlines 80 22 14m 84 
Qantas 85 17 31m 235 
Qatar Airways 165 79 30m 223 
Royal Air Maroc 105 51 8m 59 
Royal Jordanian 46 30 3m 25 
S7 Airlines 148 34 16m 99 




Appendix 3. SkyTeam Members 
Member Destinations Countries Annual Passengers Fleet Size 
Aeroflot 163 56 35,8m 250 
Aerolineas Argentinas 57 13 12,9m 82 
Aero Mexico 88 24 21,8m 121 
 136 
AirEuropa 59 24 11,8m 59 
Air France 195 91 101,4m 302 
Alitalia 100 41 21,5m 117 
China Airlines 160 29 15,6m 88 
China Eastern 272 36 112,9m 640 
Czech Airlines 31 21 2,6m 14 
DELTA 304 52 190m 800 
Garuda Indonesia 70 12 19,6m 142 
Kenya Airways 56 44 4,8m 41 
KLM 164 73 32,7m 204 
Korean air 125 44 26,8m 169 
MEA 32 23 3,1m 18 
Saudia 95 39 - 170 
Tarom 38 25 2,8m 25 
Vietnam Airlines 52 17 22m 98 
Xiamen Air 92 16 29,83m 173 
(SkyTeam, 2020) 
 
